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LIST OF SYMBOLS 
A The set of member patrons 
B The set of nonmember patrons 
C The set of outputs sold to and variable inputs and 
consumption goods purchased from the cooperative by the 
member patrons and nonmember patrons 
D The amount of debt employed by the cooperative 
DS The total dividends on member stocks 
ds The dividends on stock held by a member patron 
fc The fixed costs of a member patron 
FCC The fixed costs of a cooperative 
NS The net savings of the cooperative 
PVPR The present value of the allocated patronage refunds 
r," The expected rate of patronage refund on the ith product 
X The set of outputs produced by the members 
Xc The subset of goods in set X that represent business 
through the cooperative 
XQ The subset of goods in set X that represent business 
outside the cooperative 
Y The set of variable inputs purchased by the members 
Yc The subset of goods in set Y that represent business 
through the cooperative 
Yq The subset of goods in set Y that represent business 
outside the cooperative 
Z The set of consumption goods purchased by the member 
patrons and nonmember patrons 
Zc The subset of goods in set Z that represent business 
through the cooperative 
V 
ZQ The subset of goods in set Z that represent business 
outside the cooperative 
G The set of the club goods which the cooperative provides 
to member patrons 
F The set of fixed inputs of member 
U The set of outputs produced by the cooperative and sold to 
buyers outside cooperative 
V The set of variable inputs used by the cooperative and 
purchased by the cooperative from outside cooperative 
W The set of consumption goods purchased by the cooperative 
from outside cooperative 
Fc The set of cooperative's fixed inputs 
a The rate of reserve funds and the rate of transferred 
funds 
T (1 - a) 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Today, cooperatives exist in every country in the world 
and take many forms in relation to political system, economic 
activity and community organization. The actual incidence of 
cooperative activity also differs widely from country to 
country. 
However, in general a cooperative is an organization of 
firms or consumers which is owned and controlled by those who 
use it and is operated for their mutual benefit as patrons. 
The established cooperative with proven purchasing and 
marketing techniques plays an important role in determining 
the economic success of a farm farmers' family (Williams). 
Therefore, a cooperative must be under good management to 
maximize its contribution to members' welfare. 
Korean Cooperative 
Formation 
The Korean Agricultural Bank was first established as a 
joint-stock company in 1956 by the Financial Associations. 
But in 1957 it was reorganized into a special bank dealing 
exclusively in agricultural credit and banking. The 
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Agricultural Cooperative Law was approved by the National 
Assembly in 1957, and the agricultural cooperatives were 
founded in 1958 to engage in economic business other than 
banking business. A program for the reorganization of 
multi-purpose cooperatives was made on August 15, 1961, 
through merger of the agricultural bank and agricultural 
cooperatives. 
The Korean agricultural cooperative was not established 
because farmers saw the need for its establishment. It was 
initiated as part of a government policy to promote the 
development of the rural economy. 
The government, first of all, organized the National 
Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF). Afterwards, the 
organization was expanded vertically to include the primary 
cooperatives in the villages. The federation provided 
guidance and assistance for the establishment of primary 
cooperatives. 
The agricultural cooperatives in Korea are organized 
vertically at two levels; primary cooperatives at the township 
level and the federation at the national level. They are 
horizontally classified into two categories; multipurpose 
cooperatives and special cooperatives. The multipurpose 
cooperatives are organized by farmers primarily engaged in 
production of grain such as rice and barley, while special 
cooperatives are established by the farmers who are mainly 
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engaged in fruit and vegetable farming. There are 143 
multipurpose cooperatives and 41 special cooperatives in 
Korea. 
Activities 
An interesting feature of the Korean cooperatives is that 
all the activities concerning the farmers, i.e., marketing of 
members' output, provision of production inputs and 
consumption goods, processing, extension services, credit and 
banking, and even insurance are undertaken by the 
multi-purpose cooperatives. And in that sense, they are the 
real multi-purpose cooperative. The major businesses of the 
agricultural cooperatives are divided into economic business, 
credit and banking business, and insurance business. 
Marketing Business 
In Korea agricultural cooperatives are entrusted by the 
government with collecting rice, barely, corn, etc. under the 
government scheme for price stabilization. The most important 
among them is the collection of rice. 
However, the proportion of the policy marketing business 
under which farm products are sold at the price designated by 
the government or the NACF, has declined steadily. At the 
same time the voluntary marketing business carried out by 
primary cooperatives in the competitive market has increased. 
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In Korea, as much as 68 percent of total value of farm 
products marketed by the primary level multi-purpose 
cooperatives was represented by food grains, 80 percent of 
which was rice. And 3 3 percent of the total marketing 
turnover in 1976 of the primary level cooperatives was on 
consignment basis and the remaining 67 percent on purchase 
basis. Under the consignment sales system, the cooperatives 
sell products consigned by their members and deduct incidental 
expenses from the sales prices as commissions, and then refund 
the remainder to their members. In the purchase sales, the 
purchasing prices are paid for farm products by the 
cooperatives, and the payments to farmers, are settled at the 
time of sale. It is believed that agricultural cooperatives 
in Korea succeeded in reducing the marketing margins and 
commissions to lower levels than those of private traders by 
modernizing marketing facilities and being content with small 
profit. Thus agricultural cooperatives not only contribute to 
higher prices received by farmers but also repress unfair 
trade on the part of the merchants (Saito). Therefore, it may 
be said that marketing activities of agricultural cooperatives 
has been relatively efficient. But this is said with 
qualification in that agricultural cooperatives handled only 
29 percent of the total agricultural marketings in 1976. The 
agricultural cooperatives have not yet reached a stage wherein 
they command a dominant market share of agricultural products 
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that enables them to exert a very strong influence on price 
formation or take a price leadership role. 
Purchasing Business 
The prices and amounts of fertilizers used were 
determined by the government itself until 1982. Even the 
prices of fertilizers to farmers, transportation costs, 
storage charges and handling commission fees were annually 
determined by the government. The government notified the 
NACF of the prices and amount. In almost all cases, the 
prices to be paid by farmers were lower than the NACF 
purchasing prices. The differences were covered by government 
subsidies. NACF and primary cooperatives had generally 
functioned well in carrying out the government agency business 
for the fertilizer distribution. However, the government 
suffered snowballing deficits in its fertilizer management 
account. All the fund required for the procurement and 
management of fertilizer was provided by the government from 
the Bank of Korea, during the initial stage. 
The government had been depending, however, upon NACF for 
financing the fertilizer account with increasing deposits 
received by mainly the cooperative banking branch offices in 
city areas. NACF and primary cooperatives have experienced 
partly free sale system with the special kinds of fertilizer, 
such as ammonium sulphate, since 1983 and increased their 
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portion from 20 percent in 1983 to 60 percent in 1986 even 
though the others still have been handled by the government. 
The government changed the fertilizer distribution system to 
the so-called free sales in 1988. 
Farmers as cooperative members are both producers and 
consumers. The cooperative purchasing business for consumer 
goods may be regarded as a business in which farmers patronize 
their cooperatives as consumers. The multi-purpose 
cooperatives have carried out the purchasing business for 
consumer goods to serve farm consumers. The NACF introduced a 
nationwide cooperative chain-store system. At present, 
chain-stores are operated by expert managers, and daily 
necessities of the farmer are supplied not only through 
chain-stores, but also through the women's clubs organized 
through primary cooperatives. 
Processing Business 
Most primary cooperative associations have installed 
collection points for farm products to facilitate their 
transport. Almost all the multi-purpose cooperatives have 
their own warehouses, a fact which has contributed to the 
adjustment of demand and supply and price stabilization of 
farm products. 
The cooperative processing business is divided into two 
groups; processing for supply to members and processing of 
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members' production for sale outside the cooperative, with 
value added. The amount of cooperative processing business is 
very small. It barely keeps itself in existence. However, 
agricultural cooperatives are in a very favorable position to 
participate in or further develop the processing businesses, 
since they have a nationwide sales network and can secure raw 
materials on more favorable conditions than private firms. 
Banking Business and Insurance Business 
The primary objective of the banking business is to 
provide enough cheap credit with comprehensive services to 
meet the financial needs of member farmers. The major funding 
resources of the banking business are deposits at the NACF's 
banking offices and borrowings from the government, the Bank 
of Korea, and other international or domestic financial 
organizations. The agricultural cooperatives also provide 
member farmers with provisions against unexpected accidents 
such as sickness, death and any loss and damage from 
unforeseen disasters with the handling of cooperative 
insurance. However, these are not just for the members, most 
of the commercial banking and insurance customers are 
nonmembers. 
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Environmental Changes 
The government urged agricultural cooperatives to operate 
their business in line with the agricultural policy aimed at 
increasing food production. The Korean agricultural 
cooperatives adopted a multipurpose system to enhance the 
social and economic status of farmers. Agricultural 
cooperatives in Korea engage in various activities rather than 
specializing in a single type of business. There are 
advantages from employing a multipurpose system in a small 
country with small-scale farming. However in multipurpose 
cooperatives it is hard to devote skilled managerial efforts 
to each specialized business section. It is also difficult to 
train specialists, and to keep track of profits and losses by 
business activities and take appropriate actions. Therefore, 
the cooperatives need to develop the management skills and 
marketing methods for their businesses. After Korean farmers 
provided a sufficient amount of rice to Korean rice consumers, 
Korean farmers have tried to find other farm products which 
give them more chance to sell for or higher income from the 
market. At the same time they have shifted from production 
for family consumption to production for sale. Agricultural 
cooperatives in Korea are also presently changing from a 
government agency to organizations for the benefit of their 
members. The primary objective of cooperatives under NACF 
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(National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation) is to increase 
their own businesses rather than government policy businesses, 
and the presidents of the primary cooperatives are elected by 
the members. This cooperative movement away from being a 
guasi-governmental agency appears to be a welcome change in 
agricultural cooperatives in Korea. They can protect their 
members' interests and establish objectives that are 
consistent with members' goals. 
The Differences Between Agricultural Cooperatives in 
the United States and Korea 
1. In the United States, agricultural cooperatives are 
organized based on the commercial needs of members. 
Cooperatives and the members are closely related to each other 
in that agricultural cooperatives try to achieve the goals of 
their members. The members own and control the cooperatives. 
Unlike the cooperatives in the United States which have been 
established by farmers from the bottom up, the agricultural 
cooperatives in Korea were organized from the top-down. 
Therefore, the Korean agricultural cooperatives have very 
difficult positions to perform their businesses. They need to 
consider the government agricultural policy and members' 
interests. 
2. In the United States, agricultural cooperatives are 
organized according to the special types of businesses, and 
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they have appropriately developed the management skills and 
decision methods for their businesses. On the other hand, 
agricultural cooperatives in Korea engage in various 
activities rather than in special types of businesses. A 
multi-purpose cooperative renders it hard to devote managerial 
endeavors to a specialized business section, therefore, it is 
difficult to train specialists and it is hard to keep track of 
profits and losses by business sections and thus to make 
appropriate decisions. 
3. In the United States, the farm scale is much larger 
than the Korean farm scale. In Korea, the average farming 
acreage per farm household is about 1.17 ha which is 
equivalent to 2.89 acres. 
4. In the United States, the percentage of cooperative 
members of all farmers is less than 40 percent. In Korea, 
more than 90 percent of farmers are members of cooperatives, 
even though participation in the cooperatives is not purely 
voluntary. 
5. There are some legal differences between United States 
and Korea. In the United States, nonmember business can not 
be greater than half of total business, and all net profit is 
distributed to members with patronage refund even if a portion 
of the patronage refund is deferred. While, in Korea, 
nonmember business can not be greater than one third of total 
business, and at least 10 percent of net profit must be 
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reserved as legal reserve fund, at least 20 percent of the net 
saving also need to be reserved as a business reserve fund, 
and finally at least 20 percent of net saving must be 
transferred to next year. Therefore, only the rest of net 
saving can be distributed to members with dividend and 
patronage refund. 
Problem Statement and Objectives 
Korean agricultural cooperatives have several problems 
that have to be addressed. First of all, many members of 
Korean cooperatives have the perception that the cooperative 
is a governmental agency. Such misconception in the minds of 
the cooperative members on the real identity of cooperatives 
is bound to retard the growth and development of cooperative. 
Mendoza cited the Report of the 1966 ICA commission that in 
developing countries, the members of most cooperatives "are 
like the passengers of a train using it only when it becomes 
necessary to do so for their own individual purposes; the 
running of the train is not their business. This is what must 
inevitably happen when planning and organizing come from the 
top. The cooperative movement can not grow from the top 
downward for voluntary membership and democratic control are 
of the essence of the cooperative system (p. 25)." The more 
successful a cooperative is, the more likely are the members 
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to conceive the ambition of gaining independence from 
government supervision and work to achieve this ambition. A 
cooperative association is an organization of firms controlled 
by those who use it and operated for their mutual benefit as 
patrons. In the long run, cooperatives will be successful 
only to the extent to which they become truly self-help 
organizations. This responsibility calls for planning the 
necessary supporting educational programs, developing a sense 
of financial responsibility among members, and making a 
deliberate plan to have government agencies and their 
officials turn responsibility over to cooperatives just as 
soon as they demonstrate ability to carry it. 
Korean agricultural cooperatives need to select an 
optimum labor allocation between credit business and the 
noncredit business. The main sources of capital are now 
customers' deposits in Korean agricultural cooperative. A 
portion of profit from the credit business is transferred to 
the noncredit business. Therefore, the credit business might 
be important to Korean agricultural cooperatives, even though 
there are arguments that the credit business of agricultural 
cooperatives should be separated from the noncredit business. 
A major component of the problem is the labor allocation 
between the credit business and the noncredit business. The 
management and employees of cooperatives may prefer to 
concentrate on the credit business which is a more profitable 
13 
and less risky business than noncredit business. However, the 
cooperative should work for its members. Therefore, labor 
allocation should be made so the marginal member benefit with 
respect to labor in credit business equals the marginal member 
benefit with respect to labor in noncredit business. 
Cooperatives also need to consider financial instruments 
including the rate of patronage refunds, the rate of the 
dividend, the level of reserve funds, and the level of debt. 
The member interest in patronage refunds can enhance members' 
involvement in the cooperative business; such interest has 
increased due to recent changes. 
Korean cooperative's banking and insurance businesses are 
not just for the members, most of those businesses' customers 
are nonmembers. Cooperative's managers prefer banking and 
insurance businesses to marketing and purchasing businesses 
because marketing and purchasing businesses are riskier than 
banking and insurance businesses. However, the cooperatives 
are the organized for the members' benefit. Therefore, 
cooperative managers may be over emphasizing banking and 
insurance in which case the cooperatives need to pay increased 
attention to their marketing and purchasing businesses. 
The multipurpose primary cooperatives adopt the purchase 
sales method more than the consignment sales method. The 
purchase sales method implies that the cooperatives buy farm 
products from their members and sell them to final consumers 
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or intermediary merchants. The purchase price of farm 
products is determined when farmers hand the products over to 
the cooperatives, and the payments to farmers made on 
delivery. The purchase sales method is applicable to food 
grains and other products which stand long storage and whose 
prices are comparatively stable. The supply of chemical 
fertilizers were monopolized by the NACF and its member 
cooperatives from 1962 to 1988. However, the NACF and its 
member cooperatives must operate in a free market in 
fertilizer production and marketing since 1988. Therefore, 
cooperatives decide the farm product prices which cooperatives 
pay to their members, and the farm inputs' prices and 
consumption goods' prices which members pay to cooperatives. 
These decisions are very important decisions which affect 
member income and utility. They affect the cooperatives' 
financial status. 
The objective of this study is to introduce the idea that 
a primary agricultural cooperative is a decision unit in 
Korea. This study is about the managerial economic process, 
and is a conditional normative study: conditional upon the 
specified comparative objective function. I hope this study 
can give some idea about how Korean cooperatives ought to 
behave to provide maximum benefit to members. 
This study assumes that the employees of cooperatives are 
optimally allocated between credit business and noncredit 
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business, although there is need for further research to 
examine whether this assumption holds. This study narrows 
down the objective to concentrate on marketing and purchasing 
decisions, which are to decide the prices and quantities for 
the short run, and leaves the financial problem to future 
research. It is assumed that the objective of a cooperative 
is maximization of members' welfare. Under this assumption 
the cooperative model was constructed by modifying Royer's 
production pricing model by adding the consumption goods. 
This study first constructs a cooperative model under the 
assumption of price certainty; then, develops a model under 
price uncertainty. This study is not intended to study 
welfare economics. Some previous studies (Carson, Anderson, 
Porter,and Maurice) do study welfare consequences of 
cooperatives. 
Literature Review 
There has been no previous research about Korean 
agricultural cooperatives as decision units. Korean multi­
purpose agricultural cooperatives deal with consumption and 
production goods in their purchasing business. Therefore, the 
members patronize cooperatives as consumers and producers. 
There has also been no previous research about cooperatives 
which deal with consumption goods as well as farm inputs and 
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farm outputs. The cooperative is a special type of 
corporation which owned and controlled by its members. 
However, a reasonable assumption is that some degree of 
management control exists in most agricultural cooperative. 
Therefore, there is presumed to be a decision maker within the 
cooperative. Optimality is defined with reference to an 
assumed objective function. Theoretical models of 
cooperatives are idealizations and they represent their 
authors' views about cooperatives. A brief discussion of the 
previous research on cooperative theory will be presented. 
Emelianoff, one of the earliest cooperative theorists, 
concluded that a cooperative was an organization of 
independent units which is coordinated, owned, and controlled 
by the same independent economic entities, and the membership 
must be homogeneous. Phillips viewed a cooperative as a 
vertical extension of its member firms. Phillips argued that 
cooperation is closely analogous with vertical integration, 
and employed the theory of the multi-plant firm to derive 
optimality conditions. Among the optimality conditions are 
the following; (1) for each participating firm, the marginal 
productivity of each resource allocated to the cooperative 
plant must be equal to the marginal productivity of that 
resource in the individual plants of that firm, and the 
marginal productivity of the last dollar must be equal in 
every use within each firm, (2) regarding the volume of 
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patronage, the cooperating firm equates the sum of the 
marginal costs in its individual plant or plants and the 
marginal cost in the joint plant with the marginal revenue 
facing the firm in the market where the product is sold. 
Emelianoff and Phillips viewed members as the sole decision 
agents in a cooperatives. Most early writers followed 
Emelianoff and Phillips in specifying that there was little or 
no role for management in cooperatives. Aresvik and Ohm 
expressed skepticism concerning Phillip's second optimality 
condition. Each member is likely to consider the average 
revenue obtainable from a marketing cooperative, and the 
average cost incurred by a farm supply or marketing 
cooperative, in determining his volume of patronage. One 
reason members will base their patronage decisions on average 
cost or revenue is that members are not informed about the 
joint plant's cost and revenue functions. Therefore, members 
may behave as price takers relative to the cooperative. 
Trifon investigated Phillips' first optimality condition, 
and argued that it is inconsistent with proportionality, as 
well as unlikely to be realized in practice. Proportionality 
requires that each member's capital contribution be 
proportional to his patronage. 
Stephen Enke was the earliest formal cooperative theorist 
and the only early writer to suggest an active role for 
management. He proposed a model of a 'consumer cooperative' 
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in which the objective pursued by the decision maker was to 
maximize the members' welfare, as measured by the sum of 
consumer surplus plus profits. He uses the term 'profits' to 
describe what most writers now term 'net savings•. Enke 
derives a criterion for optimal resource use: the general 
welfare requires that all business units follow a price policy 
which results in a scale of operation such that marginal cost 
is equal to the marginal demand price of the market. To 
achieve this, the cooperative business unit must produce a 
level of output such that average revenue equals marginal 
cost. 
Clark presented a model in which the decision makers' 
objective was to minimize the cost of providing a good or 
service to members. Clark assumed that each member's physical 
patronage is a fixed amount. Not even in the short run is it 
reasonable to assume that supply and demand curves are 
perfectly inelastic, so this assumption is a major weakness of 
Clark's model. Clark assumed that the decision maker would 
achieve an optimal volume of business by regulating the number 
of members. This assumption may be inconsistent with the best 
interest of members. 
Helmberger and Hoos developed a theoretical model of a 
single-product agricultural cooperative. In their model, the 
objective assumed for the cooperative is maximization of the 
net price paid to members. Equality of treatment among 
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members was achieved by paying the same net price to all 
members. The decision maker's problem can be broken into two 
parts. First, regardless of how much final product the 
cooperative produces, it is desirable to produce this amount 
of product at the lowest possible cost. Second, the quantity 
of output must be chosen to maximize the cooperative's surplus 
(net savings), which is equivalent to maximization of the net 
price paid to members. The necessary condition is that 
cooperative marginal revenue equals its marginal cost. 
Hardie extended the Helmberger and Hoos model to deal 
with a multiproduct marketing cooperative. In order to cast 
the model into a linear programming framework, the 
cooperative's production function is assumed to be linear and 
homogeneous with discontinuous factor substitution. Hardie 
also assumed that the cooperative's average variable cost of 
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producing each final product was known and constant, and that 
joint fixed costs were allocated. His multiproduct marketing 
cooperative had profit maximization as its objective. The 
price paid for a raw product was the shadow price associated 
with that product. The shadow price was the average monetary 
contribution of a raw product to the cooperative's total 
profit. He noted that separable programming methods could be 
used to apply his model to cases where demand curves for final 
products were downward sloping and average total costs were 
not constant. 
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Ladd also expanded the analysis of the Helmberger and 
Hoos model to a multiproduct cooperative. In Ladd's model of 
bargaining cooperative, the cooperative performed three 
services; (1) it sold a farm input to both members and 
non-members, (2) it provided an excludable public good to its 
members at no direct charge, (3) it bargained on behalf of its 
members for higher raw product prices. Ladd considered two 
alternative objectives which might be pursued by the decision 
maker; (1) maximize the price paid to members for their raw 
product, and (2) maximize the amount of raw product marketed 
through the cooperative. The first order conditions were 
different in the two cases, and different from those of a 
profit maximizing proprietary firm. 
Royer's work in modeling cooperative associations 
incorporated many of the ideas presented by earlier 
researchers. A nonlinear programming model of a multiproduct 
cooperative was presented. Royer incorporated decision making 
at the level of the individual farmer. The cooperative did 
non-member business on a profit basis, and permitted members 
to patronize other firms. An individual farmer's profit is 
written: 
Tt = y[ Pi^i - Y. PiQi - fc + ds + pvpr 
iex iey 
where p; = the price of the ith product 
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q, = the quantity of the ith product 
X = a set of farm outputs 
Y = a set of farm inputs 
fc = fixed costs 
ds = dividends on stock 
pvpr = expected present value of patronage refunds 
where s = the proportion of patronage refunds paid in cash 
T = the revolving fund period 
r/ = the expected per unit patronage refund on products 
sold to, or inputs purchased from cooperative 
C = the set of outputs sold and variable inputs 
purchased from the cooperative by the member and 
nonmember patrons 
By adding production and fixed factor usage constraints, a 
lagrangian function was formed. The necessary conditions for 
expected profit maximization are that, if the ith product is 
produced, it should be produced up to the point at which the 
marginal cost of producing it is equal to its effective price 
which is the cash price plus the discounted expected per unit 
patronage refund on the product. Under certain assumptions, 
the necessary conditions will also be sufficient for 
maximization of expected profit. Input demand and output 
pvpr = s + 
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supply functions of the form: 
^ ^X' ^c> Oq) i G Xi Y 
can be derived, where Py, He*, Qc are vectors of a member's 
output prices, input prices, expected per-unit patronage 
refunds, and public goods provided by the cooperative 
respectively. 
The cooperative decision maker's objective is to maximize 
the total profits of- its members, written as: 
n = E Pi^ic - E -  F C ^  D S  +  P V P R  
iex ieY 
where Q;c = the quantity of the ith product purchased or sold 
by the member patrons 
FC = the total members' fixed cost 
DS = the total dividends on stock 
PVPR = the present value of all allocated patronage 
refunds 
Three constraints - a production function, fixed factors 
usage, and the allowable amount of non-member business - were 
placed on the cooperative profit function. Royer derived 
first order conditions for the cooperative decision maker. 
The conditions are complex and I will discuss them in more 
detail in chapter 3. Royer recommends that the cooperative 
decision maker allocate joint fixed costs on an opportunity 
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cost basis. The opportunity cost of a fully employed factor 
is its shadow price. 
Eversull employed Royer's model in an empirical study to 
show practical applications of the model. Hypothetical 
cooperatives were simulated to analyze the optimality 
conditions and provide insight into cooperative management 
practices. He assumed that producer demand and supply 
functions were linearly related to basis (futures prices -
cash prices) values. He utilized quadratic programming to 
solve for optimal basis values that the cooperative should 
use. VanSickle also utilized Royer's work and estimated the 
supply and demand equations for several commodities using data 
from Iowa cooperatives. VanSickle studied the cooperative 
decision nexus between production, pricing, and financing and 
integrated these decisions into one model. A submodel using 
Royer's work was developed as the basis for the production and 
pricing decisions and a submodel which maximized total 
collective profits of all members was used for financial 
decisions. The study separated the cooperative decision nexus 
into three interdependent steps: (1) short-run determination 
of pricing and production practices, (2) long-run investment 
portfolio determination, (3) determining the long-run 
cooperative financial structure. The production and pricing 
decisions were solved by using an enhanced Royer's model 
whereas a cooperative financial model was developed to answer 
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long-run financial questions. VanSickle and Ladd used the 
theoretical model presented by VanSickle and derived optimal 
levels of qualified patronage refunds, stock dividends, 
revolving fund period, rate of cash patronage refund, and the 
amount of cooperative debt by maximizing cooperative profits. 
The level of price, production, and investment were assumed 
exogenous in the financial model of profit maximization. 
Their results supported the conclusion that cooperatives had 
in the past relied too heavily on deferred patronage refunds 
as a source of financing. 
Fischer developed a model that consolidated the optimal 
production, pricing, and financing decision of the cooperative 
decision maker. Using an objective function similar to 
Royer's, Fischer assumed that a typical cooperative member 
would maximize his expected after-tax profit. A model of a 
single product farm supply cooperative was used to look at the 
cost of the cooperative's capital. Capital costs were 
determined for a risk neutral member on a pre-tax and 
after-tax basis, then for a risk averse member on an after-tax 
basis. Fischer found that the cooperative's cost of capital 
was a decreasing function of leverage and that most 
cooperative should utilize more debt capital. 
Passe developed a cooperative model that allowed 
different types of members to be treated differently. He used 
Royer's model for his production and pricing decision model 
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and used a modification developed by VanSickle and Ladd 
following Jones's criticisms of his financial decision model. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions yielded by his model were similar 
to Royer's and VanSickle's. The computer model utilized three 
product lines with each being purchased or supplied by two 
distinct patron groups. A four stage procedure was used in 
the computer simulation model. The steps employed in the 
application procedure involved: (1) specifying the member and 
non-member supply and demand functions, (2) solving a pricing, 
production model to determine the price and quantity for each 
patron group, (3) solving a financial model through a two-step 
procedure to ascertain the optimal values of T and s, and (4) 
updating the exogenous parameters of the pricing, production 
model with the new values for membership patronage, T, and S. 
This empirical analysis showed the applicability of 
theoretical model. 
Carson derived basic pricing, production, and resource 
allocation rules for consumer and producer cooperatives. In 
order to do this, a somewhat general model of a firm was 
developed, capable of comprising cooperative, as well as the 
conventional owner-controlled firm of economic theory. He 
focused on cooperatives as sellers of private goods and buyers 
of inputs on the market. He considered cooperative as a 
welfare maximizing enterprise. Thus the objective of 
cooperative decision maker is the maximizing a welfare 
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function, 
W ( U ^ ,  U ^ ,  U j ,  ) 
which is increasing in each U^, subject to constraints posed by 
its production function and the budget constraints, where is 
the utility function of the k-th member firm. He concluded 
that a generalized welfare maximizing firm maximizes member 
welfare by maximizing the sum of its total profit plus the 
value of members' consumer and factor surplus, which is 
similar to Enke's result. As a general rule, Carson's G-firm 
(generalized welfare-maximizing firm) will operate in the 
closed intervals between the profit maximizing and full 
welfare maximizing rates of output and inputs. The more 
consumer or producer members it has for given unrestricted 
demand and supply curves, the closer it will be to the latter. 
Zusman analyzed the group choice process in a cooperative 
enterprise to derive its implications for the efficient 
allocation of the organization and the distribution of income 
among its members. The analysis dealt with a specific 
problem, the short-run allocation of the cost of operation 
among members of an agricultural marketing cooperative. He 
argued that a cost allocation rule is a rule that determines 
the part of total marketing cost allocated to each member as a 
function of the cost allocation criteria. In order to decide 
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the efficient choice of the cost allocation parameters, he 
adopted Carson's cooperative welfare function. The objective 
of a cooperative decision maker was maximization of 
cooperative welfare function subject to zero profit 
constraint. 
Anderson, Porter, and Maurice extended Enke's work, but 
their work was based on a framework of utility maximization. 
They concluded that consumer-owned, consumer-managed firms, 
organized to maximize the utility of each member, reached the 
same long-run equilibrium position as the perfectly 
competitive firm, if the cooperatives could freely determine 
the number of members. 
After reviewing the previously cited articles that 
consider member's utility as their objective criteria. I 
adopted Carson's cooperative welfare function for a 
cooperative decision maker's objective function, and modified 
Royer's pricing, production model in order to decide optimal 
values of cooperative instrument variables. 
Following Chapters 
Chapter 2 presents individual member's pricing and 
production decision including consumption goods under price 
certainty. In Chapter 3, a cooperative's model under 
certainty is presented, and first order conditions and their 
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economic interpretations are also presented. Chapter 4 
presents simplification of the cooperative's model and 
interpretations. Chapter 5 considers these decisions under 
price uncertainty. Chapter 6 consists of a summary, 
conclusion, and suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL 
In Korea, an agricultural cooperative is a multipurpose 
cooperative. It includes in its functions that of cooperative 
credit business along with sales and purchasing businesses. A 
rural community in Korea is formed around this cooperative. 
More than 90 percent of farmers are members of primary 
agricultural cooperatives. The reason of the development of 
credit business in cooperative is to solve the financing 
problems of cooperatives and their members. However, in this 
model, we assume Korean agricultural cooperatives adopt the 
departmental accounting system and build the model for 
non-credit businesses, which are sales and purchasing 
businesses. 
In this chapter, a model of a typical member patron and a 
model of a typical nonmember patron are.presented. These 
models are sub-models of the cooperative model. After these, 
the cooperative model under certainty will be presented in 
Chapter 3. Figure 2.1 shows the relationships between the 
patrons and the cooperative. Figure 2.2 indicates the flows 
of products within the cooperative production process. 
The cooperative purchases unprocessed products (set X) 
from member patrons and supplies them with variable inputs 
(set Y) which they use in production, and also supplies them 
and nonmember patrons with consumption goods (set Z). The 
30 
Member Patrons < 
A t  
X 
f A 
Cooperative 
Buyers Outside Coop 
Sellers Outside Coop 
Sellers Outside Coop 
U ^  Buyers Outside Coop 
y 
Sellers Outside Coop 
Sellers Outside Coop 
Nonmember Patrons 
• Goods 
Key • Patronage Refunds 
^ Cash or Credit 
Figure 2.1 Model of the Cooperative 
Markets Cooperative Patrons 
(E>-
Figure 2.2 Flows of Products within Cooperative 
32 
cooperative determines the prices it pays for purchased 
unprocessed products and the prices it charges for the sale of 
variable inputs and consumption goods. Not all of the inputs 
which the cooperative supplies to its patrons are sold. Some 
of them are club goods (set G). Because it is assumed that 
member patrons enjoy the benefits of these club goods, the 
cooperative does not sell them. Instead, it provides them to 
member patrons free of charge and finances them from other 
business or capital. An example of a club good is a 
production technique that cooperative develops and provides to 
member patrons without any charge. 
In addition to doing business with member and nonmember 
patrons, the cooperative deals with buyers and sellers outside 
the cooperative. The cooperative purchases variable inputs 
(set V) for use in processing the unprocessed products which 
it purchases from its member patrons and for use in producing 
the inputs which it supplies its member patrons. It also 
purchases the consumption goods (set W) to supply to its 
patrons. The cooperative also sells the processed products 
(set U). 
In this model, a product of the member firms which is 
simply marketed by the cooperative could be included as a 
special case of an unprocessed product without the use of 
inputs. However, because it is assumed that the marketing of 
any product through the cooperative requires the use of some 
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inputs, there is technically no difference between a product 
processed by the cooperative and one marketed through it and 
no distinction is made between the two. Similarly, no 
distinction is made between a variable input supplied to 
member firms by the cooperative which is produced by the 
cooperative and one which is simply purchased by the 
cooperative and resold to member firms. 
The cooperative distributes patronage refunds to only its 
member patrons and also pays members dividends on stock, but 
it is assumed for convenience that nonmembers do not hold 
stock in the cooperative. The members and nonmembers are not 
required to do business exclusively with the cooperatives. 
Instead, they purchase variable inputs and consumption goods 
from outside the cooperative as well as from the cooperative. 
They also can sell farm products outside the cooperative as 
well as to the cooperative. 
Model of a Member Patron 
In the sub-models of the typical member patron and the 
typical nonmember patron, it is assumed that each patron 
attempts to maximize his utility. 
The set of products produced by the member patrons is 
represented by X. The subset of products in X which are sold 
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to the cooperative is represented by while the subset of 
products which are sold to buyers outside the cooperative is 
represented by XQ. The set of variable factors of production 
purchased by the patron firms is represented by Y. The subset 
of variable inputs in Y purchased from the cooperative is 
represented by Y^ while the subset of variable inputs 
purchased from sellers outside the cooperative is represented 
by YQ. Similarly, the set of consumption goods purchased by 
the patrons is represented by Z. The subset of the 
consumption goods in Z which are purchased from the 
cooperative is represented by Z^ while the subset of 
consumption good purchased from sellers outside the 
cooperative is represented by Zq. Both the member and 
nonmember patrons are assumed to be price takers with respect 
to all of the prices they pay or receive. The set of fixed 
inputs of production which are available to the typical member 
patron is represented by F. 
I assume that the patrons have perfect knowledge of the 
prices at the time they make their production and consumption 
decision. Therefore, they can immediately determine whether 
they sell their products to cooperative or outside 
cooperative. The typical member patron tries to maximize his 
utility subject to budget constraint and production 
constraint. His utility depends upon the amount of 
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consumption goods. Therefore, his problem is to solve; 
max U  =  U ( z ^ ,  Z 2 ,  Z j '  •  •  • )  3 .  t  n  -  =  0  
iez 
note; 7t = 52 Pi<5ri - X) PiQi - fc + ds + pr 
iex iey 
= E ^i 
iec 
g_£ = Zj^ for iez 
where pj and are respectively the price paid or received and 
the quantity of the ith product or factor or consumption good, 
fc is the fixed cost of the member, ds is the dividends on 
stock, and pr is the patronage refund. The symbol C is the 
set of outputs sold to and set of variable inputs and 
consumption goods purchased from the cooperative by the member 
and nonmember patrons, r,' is the rate of per-unit patronage 
refund for the ith good. The typical member firm can look at 
its own specific production function to determine optimal 
levels of production. The individual member's production 
function is assumed to be a single valued continuous function 
with continuous first and second order partial derivatives. 
This strictly concave production function for member is 
specified in the implicit form as: 
9y, ( J f  O q )  = 0 
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where is a vector of the quantities of each of the products 
in set X produced by the firm, qy is a vector of the quantities 
of each of the variable inputs in set Y used in production, 
and qf is a vector of the quantities of each of the fixed 
inputs in set F used in production. The symbol Qg represents 
a vector of the quantities of each of the set G of club goods 
provided by the cooperative. 
The maximization is also subject to a set of constraints 
which come from the fact that production can utilize only the 
amounts of fixed inputs that are available. This availability 
constraints are given as; 
g-j  ^Qi ieF 
where q, is the stock of ith fixed factor available to the 
typical member. Then, we can set up the lagrangian function 
which represents a maximization of a member's utility subject 
to his budget constraint. This is given as; 
Tj — C/ ( Z-^ f ^2 t ^3 f • • • ) 
+ E - E " E - fc + ds + r] Qi 
iex ley iez iec 
+ >-2 [ <t> ?y. ?f' O g )  ]  
+ E ^3i 
ieF 
(2.1) 
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where X, is the lagrange multiplier corresponding to the budget 
constraint, Xj is the lagrange multiplier corresponding to the 
production function, are the lagrange multiplier 
corresponding to the ith fixed input constraint. Corresponding 
to the lagrangian function is a set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions. 
These are necessary conditions for a global maximum. They are 
sufficient conditions for a global maximum if the objective 
function is concave, the constraints are concave, and the set 
of feasible solutions are bounded and nonempty. It is assumed 
that utility function is concave, and production function is 
also concave. The budget constraint and the fixed input 
constraints are linear and, therefore, can be considered as 
concave. Thus, if it is assumed that the set of feasible 
conditions are necessary and sufficient for a global maximum. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the problem are as follows: 
(1) for all i e Zc 
Z j k  0  
(2) for all i e ZQ 
dL dU 
dz^ dz^ - AiPj ^  0 
dL 
dz Z J ~ 0 
Z, k 0 
(3) for all i e Xc 
dL 
àQi = ^i(Pi + ^i) + ^ 2"^ ^  0 
dL 
dQi Qi = 0 
Qi ^ 0 
(4) for all i e XQ 
-§§1 = ^iPi + ^ ° 
dL 
dQi <7i = 0 
Qi ^ 0 
(5) for all i e Yc 
dL 
dQi = Ai(- Pi + ^ 1 )  + ^ 2  
6(|) 
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dL 
dQi 
<Ii ^ 0 
<7i = 0 
(6) for all i e YQ 
-s§l ' ^ ° 
dL 
àqi 
= 0 
9i ^  0 
(7) for all i e F 
dL 
dq^ 
- 0 
g_£ ^ 0 
(8) for 
dL 
= Y^ Pi^ i - YPi^ i - T.Pi^ i - fc + ds + 2] rlq^  = 0 
iex ier 26Z iec 
ÔL 
6Xi 
A i ^ O  
&! = 0 
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(9) for X2 
-0^  = (}) ( g^ , Qy, Qf, Qq) = o 
(10) for all Xji, i 6 F 
dL 
3^3i 
= k 0 
X3J k 0 
Given these first order conditions, if we assume the 
marginal value products of the fixed factors (set F) do not 
reach zero, the fixed factor will be exhausted in the 
production process. If we also impose the non-satiation 
assumption, the economic implications and results of the model 
can be more easily derived and understood. 
The lagrange multiplier X, can be interpreted as the 
variation of the objective function due to change in the 
dividend and fixed cost. That is: 
So we may interpret X, as marginal utility of money. If we set 
X = Xj/X,, then X can be interpreted as the imputed value or 
shadow price of (p (Royer, p.37), and X^; is interpreted as the 
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variation of objective function due to change in the level of 
ith fixed input. 
Then, condition 1 indicates that members consider not 
only the price for buying consumption good from cooperative 
but also the patronage refund caused by their patronizing the 
cooperative. Condition 2 indicates that members consider only 
the price for buying consumption good which they buy from 
outside the cooperative. Therefore, the marginal rate of 
substitution between good i (i e Zc) and good j (j e ZQ) is 
defined as: 
MRS„ = ''' " 
" Pi 
If we rewrite the condition 3 with 
+ r'i = - for all i e 
= - k where X = 
Then, it indicates that the members will produce the 
unprocessed product and sell to the cooperative at the point 
where the effective price equals to marginal cost of producing 
it (Royer, p. 38). The effective price is the price received 
from the cooperative plus the patronage refund. Condition 4 is 
similar to condition 3. The members will produce the 
unprocessed product and sell outside the cooperative at the 
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point where the price received is equal to the marginal cost 
of producing it, i.e., 
Pi = -^ ^ for all i e X 
^ dg^ dg^ O 
A similar conclusion may be reached about the demand for 
inputs (set Y). The member patron will demand inputs from the 
cooperative to the point where the effective price is equal to 
the marginal value product of using the inputs in the 
production, i.e., 
The member will purchase inputs outside the cooperative to the 
point where the price of the input equals the marginal value 
product of using the input in the production, i.e., from 
condition 6, 
In condition 7, the level of fixed input usage is determined. 
If ith factor is used, its imputed value equals to its 
marginal value product. Condition 8 indicates the budget 
constraint, conditions 9, and 10 show production and fixed 
input constraints. 
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Model of a Nonmember Patron 
The typical nonmember patron tries to maximize his 
utility subject to the budget constraint. We assume that the 
cooperative does business with nonmembers only in the 
consumption goods business. The typical nonmember patron's 
utility function depends upon the amount of consumption goods. 
Therefore, his problem is to solve: 
max U  =  U { z ^ ,  Zg, 23, , . . ) subject to I -  ^  = Q 
iez 
where I is income, pj and are the price paid and the 
quantity of the ith consumption good. Then, the corresponding 
lagrangian function is: 
L  =  U ( z ^ ,  Z 2 ,  Z3, . . . ) + A, ( J - p_£g-^  ) 
iez 
and the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
(11) for all i £ Z 
dL du 
ê ' . - "  
X Pj s 0 
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(12) for \ 
II = J - = 0 
Condition 11 indicates that nonmembers consider only the price 
in deciding whether to buy consumption goods from the 
cooperative or outside cooperative. Therefore, the marginal 
rate of substitution between good i and good j, where i e z^, 
j e ZQ is defined as: 
MRS.. = 
^ Pj 
Consumption Good Demand, Output Supply, and 
Input Demand Functions 
Consumption-good demand functions, output supply 
functions, and input demand functions for the typical member 
and the typical nonmember patrons can be derived from the 
Kuhn-tucker conditions if the bordered Hessian matrix of the 
model is nonvanishing and negative definite. The results 
provide us output supply functions for products in set and 
set XQ, input demand functions for inputs in set and set YQ, 
and demand functions for consumption goods in set Zq and ZQ. 
The general functions can be represented as: 
for i e Xq, XQ, Zq, ZQ, YG, YQ 
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(Px' Py Pz' ^c> ds, fc, Qq) = ql { .) 
note ; ql { . ) = zl { . ) for all ieZ 
where is a vector of the prices of the products in set X, Py 
is a vector of the prices of the variable inputs in set Y, p^ 
is a vector of the prices of the consumption goods in set Z, 
rc* is a vector of the patronage refunds on the products in set 
C. Then, a typical member patron n's indirect utility 
function can be expressed as; 
^In ~ ' Z2 ( . ) / . . . . / Zjj { • ) ) 
= (Px' Py Pz' ^c> d s ,  f c ,  Qq )  ( 2 . 2 )  
From the envelope theorem: 
for all j e Z^, Yc 
- - \^qj ^ 0 
dp J 
for all j e Xc 
w, - ° 
for all j e Z^, Xp, Yc 
i 0 
ar; 
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which imply that the prices of consumption goods and farm 
inputs offered by the cooperative have negative effects on 
members' utilities, the prices of farm products offered by the 
cooperative have positive effects on members' utilities, and 
finally the patronage refunds have positive effects on 
members' utilities. 
By horizontally summing the individual output supply 
function for product i in set X across all member patrons, a 
supply function, relating the level of the output supplied by 
the member patrons to the parameters, can be determined. A 
demand function, relating the level of the ith variable in put 
in set Y demanded by the member patrons to the parameters, can 
be determined by horizontally summing the individual input 
functions for the input across all member patrons. In a 
similar manner, a demand function, relating the level of the 
ith consumption food in set Z demanded by the member patrons 
and nonmember patrons to the parameters, can be determined by 
horizontally summing the individual consumption demand 
functions for the consumption good across all member. For all 
i G Xç, Zg 
qj" = q™ {Px, Py, Pg, r*, fc. ds, Q^) 
where q;™ is the total quantity supplied of the unprocessed 
products (set X) by the members or total quantity demanded of 
47 
the inputs (set Y) or consumption goods (set Z) by the member 
patrons. Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions corresponding to 
the typical nonmember patron, consumption good demand 
functions for the nonmember patrons can be derived. The 
general functions can be represented as, for i e Z^, Zq 
Ql = Qi iPz. I) 
where I is the income of nonmember patron. 
The total quantity demanded by all nonmember patrons from 
the cooperative of all consumption goods in set Z^ will be the 
horizontal summation across all nonmembers for each good, 
i.e., for all i e Zg 
= E (Pz, f) 
ieB 
Then, the total quantity demanded by all member patrons 
and nonmember patrons from the cooperative of all consumption 
goods in set Z^ will be the horizontal summation across all 
members' and nonmembers' demand for each good, i.e., for all 
i e Zc 
gr/= gf + gf 
= g/(Px' Py Pz' fc, ds, Qq) 
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where is the total quantity demanded of the ith consumption 
good by all member patrons and nonmember patrons. 
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CHAPTER 3. DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIVE MODEL UNDER CERTAINTY 
The Cooperative's Model 
The objective of the cooperative decision maker is the 
maximization of the welfare function whose elements are the 
individual members' indirect utility functions. The reason 
for this objective is that the purpose of the cooperative is 
to benefit the member patrons. 
The cooperative determines the prices it will pay for 
purchased unprocessed products and the prices it charges for 
the sale of variable inputs and consumption goods to patrons 
in order to maximize the welfare function of cooperative. The 
cooperative also purchases variable inputs (set V) and 
consumption goods (set W) from sellers outside the cooperative 
and sells finished products (set U) to buyers outside 
cooperative. Therefore, the cooperative's decision maker also 
needs to decide the quantities of inputs and consumption goods 
to buy from outside sellers, and the quantity of output to 
sell to outside buyers. 
Most Korean agricultural cooperatives save money from 
their net savings according to their articles. At least 10 
percent of net savings must be set aside as a legal reserve 
until the fund reaches two times of sum of investment stock. 
At least 20 percent of the net savings must be saved as a 
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business reserve fund. And finally at least 20 percent of net 
savings must be transferred to next year's business. But, 
there is little difference between legal reserve and business 
reserve fund except that business reserve funds are spent 
first in case of loss. Therefore, at least 50 percent of net 
savings is reserved by cooperative without allocation to 
patrons. The unallocated reserve funds may avoid complex 
financing problems. However, use of unallocated reserve funds 
as a method of accumulating capital has problems. As the 
proportion of the unallocated reserve funds increase, members 
lose a sense of ownership and management may become more 
independent and less subject to member's control. It may 
reduce the member's welfare and efficiency of resource 
allocation. Later, we will discuss the effects of these 
restrictions. However, in this model, we first set up the 
model according to their articles, so we get constraints from 
these restrictions. 
In this model, the cooperative decision makers decide the 
prices in the beginning of fiscal year. At the end of the 
fiscal year they decide the rates of the reserve funds, the 
rate of dividends on stock, and the rate of the patronage 
refunds. Therefore, at the beginning of the fiscal year, 
cooperative decision makers decide the prices based on the 
values of financial instruments which were decided during the 
last year in order to maximize the welfare function of the 
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cooperative whose elements are the individual members' 
indirect utility functions. The welfare function of the 
cooperative can be expressed as: 
W = W{V ,^ V )^ 
where each V; is defined by equation 2.2. This welfare 
function is increasing in each member's indirect utility 
function V^. It is maximized subject to constraints imposed by 
cooperative's restriction on distribution of net savings and 
cooperative's production. 
Determination and Distribution of Net Savings 
The total net savings of the cooperative is determined by 
summing the net savings earned by the cooperative in all its 
transactions. It can be expressed as: 
= 52 Pigi + 52 Pi?™ + E Pi^/ 
ieu i€Yc ieZc 
- ( E Pi^i + E Pl^i + S + f'CC + rD) 
lev iew ieXc 
= TCR - TCC 
where FCC, r, and D are cooperative's fixed cost, interest 
rate, and the level of debt respectively. TCR the first line 
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of 3.1 and TCC the second line of 3.1 are total collective 
revenue of cooperative and total collective cost of 
cooperative. Total collective revenue is received by the 
cooperative for the actions it undertakes. Similarly, total 
collective cost is paid by the cooperative for the actions it 
undertakes. According to each cooperative's articles, at 
least 50 percent of net savings needs to be reserved by the 
cooperative. Let a equal the reserve rate, and T = (1 - a), 
then T is less than or equal to 0.5. The rest of net savings 
can be distributed to member patrons as dividends on stock and 
patronage refunds, i.e., 
xNS + pr„ 
neA neA 
= DS rlgf 
iec 
where A is the set of member patrons and DS is the total 
dividend on member stock. 
Production Function 
The technology of the cooperative is represented by a 
production function which, in its implicit form, is written 
as: 
$ (QU' ^X' Qy Qy Oyt Qz' ^G' ~ ® 
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where Qu is a vector of the quantities of each of the products 
in set U, is a vector of quantities of outputs in set Xc, Qv 
is a vector of the quantities of the variable inputs in set V, 
Qy is a vector of the quantities of each of the variable 
inputs in set Yq, is a vector of quantities of consumption 
goods in set W, Q2 is a vector of quantities of the 
consumption goods in set Z^, QQ is a vector of the quantities 
of each of the club goods in set G. Qpc is a vector of the 
quantities of each of the fixed inputs in set F^. The 
assumptions made concerning this production function are 
similar to those made concerning the production function of 
the typical member patron. It is assumed that the production 
function possesses continuous first and second order partial 
derivatives. It is written in such a way that the partial 
derivatives with respect to the outputs are positive and the 
partial derivatives with respect to the inputs are negative. 
Other Constraints 
Other constraints come from full use of purchased goods 
from patrons and availabilities of fixed inputs. 
For all i e Xc 
Q™ - E = 0 
ieu, Y 
The quantity of the ith product in set X^, used in production 
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of the jth product by the cooperative is represented by qjj. 
For all i 6 Fc 
- E ^ ° 
jeu.Y.z.G 
The quantity of the ith fixed input in set F^ used in 
production of the jth product by the cooperative is 
represented by q^. 
In this model, since we build the model for noncredit 
business, we can ignore the limit upon nonmember business as a 
percentage of total business because nonmember business exists 
only in consumption goods' business, but the consumption 
good's business is less than 20 percent of the total noncredit 
business in 1988. Thus, the lagrangian function corresponding 
to the problem of the cooperative can be expressed as: 
L = W{V ,^ V ,^ ) 
+ XjxNS - DS - E iec I 
(Q[jt Qx> Oy ^Z' ^G' ) 
+ E - E 
ieXc \ jer.u / 
+ E - E 
iSFc \ jeY.Z.U.G I 
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The instrument variables of the cooperative are the following 
prices and quantities: 
Pi for i e Xc, Yc, Zc 
q, for i e U, W, G 
qjj for i 6 Xc, and j e Y, U 
qy for i e Fc, and j e Y, Z, U, G 
qjj for i e V, and j e U, Y, G. 
Now, if we drop the reserve fund restriction the 
lagrangian function representing the problem of the 
cooperative is obtained from the preceding lagrangian function 
by setting T equal to unity in the first restriction. 
Kuhn-Tucker Conditions and Interpretation 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary conditions for a 
global maximum corresponding to the instruments and the 
lagrangian function. They are sufficient conditions for a 
global maximum if the objective function is concave, the 
constraints are concave, and the set of feasible solutions is 
bounded and nonempty. These properties are assumed to hold in 
this dissertation. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the 
lagrangian function with the reserve fund restriction are as 
follows. In obtaining these, the term NS in the first 
constraint is replaced by its definition from equation (3.1). 
(13) for all j e Xc 
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dL  ^ y\ 
^Pj ~ A 3Pj 
+  A o [ T (  E  
agi 3M Êsl 
ieïe ifec ^ E P i  
30 3g/ 
iec ôg/ 
iCXr apj. 
aL 
aPi 
Pj = 0 
Pj ^  0 
(14) for all j e Y( 
dL _ atv av^ 
apj ~ A av^ „ apj 
+ AO [ T ( GRJ^ + G PJ agi 
TM 
ieYc iez. E P i  
-  E P ' # ^ )  - E ^ : # ]  ieXa iec dp. 
, 1 a$ ag/ 
'A* agf fk». 
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E  ^
TM 
2eXc 
21 
dql 
dpj ^ 0 
10; ° 
P j % 0  
(15) for all j e Zf 
66 = 22 
P^j ^Pj 
,7W 
ap. 
>-.E 
80 6g/ 
^ ôg/ ^Pj 
E  ^ 7M 2i leXr 6gi ap^  ^ 0 
dL 
dPj Pj - 0 
Pj ^ 0 
(16) for all j e W 
^ = A,,t( -Pj - 9;-^) * ^ 0 
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dL 
dqj 
Qj  ^ 0 
cfj - 0 
(17) for all j e U 
dL dp. 6$ 
dgj  ^ dgj 
dL 
dqj Qj - 0 
& 0 
(18) for all j e G 
dL ^ ^ 
+  A o [ t (  E  
egf 
ierc 
60 ag™ 
agf 
i€X„ a?, 
dL 
dg. Qj - 0 
Qj  ^ 0 
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(19) for all i e Xc, and j e Y, U 
- ^ 2i ^ 0 
agTjj 
dL 
.. — 0 
3<7ij 
Qjj ^  0 
(20) for all i e V, and j e Y, U, G 
= XQ-C ( - Pj - Qi-^ ) + ^ 0 
° dg,j dq_ 
dL 
dq, ij 
.. — 0 
^ 0 
note; q^ = ^ij aii i 6 V 
jey, u, G 
(21) for all i 6 Fc, and j e Y, Z, U, G 
= 1^-1?- - ^ 32 3 0 dq^ j  ^ 6gjj 
dL 
cktj ° 
<?ij  ^ 0 
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(22) for Xo 
= xNS - DS -T rlqj" = 0 
<^<^0 iec 
(23) for X, 
= 0 ( 0 [/r Qx' Qv Qy > Qw  ^Z> ^G' GfC") - 0 
(24) for X21, i e Xc 
dL „TM 
= or™ - E = 0 
ie y, £/ 
(25) for Xji, i e Fc 
dL -
= 9i - E ^ 0 jey.z.u.G 
'Êr 
"31 
^3i ^ 0 
Before we interpret the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we need 
to interpret the lagrange multipliers. The lagrange 
multiplier XQ can be interpreted as the variation in welfare 
due to autonomous change in net savings, or 
X. = .. or 3" 
° d( - xFCC) di - trD) 
where FCC, rD are the constant term in the constraint of net 
savings for distribution. That is marginal welfare of fixed 
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cost or marginal welfare of debt cost. We may interpret X Q as 
marginal welfare of the unit of cooperative's money income. 
If cooperative's production constraint is solved for one 
output in set U, say then 
Qu ~ ( Qu' Qx' • • • • / Qq  )  
where Qu' is set U without the first product. Then, the third 
line of the cooperative's lagrangian function can be rewritten 
as: 
[ Qu ~ ( Qu t Ox' • • • • / Qq ) ] 
Therefore, 
1 _ aw 
which is the contribution of q^' to marginal welfare of 
members. 
The lagrange multiplier Xj; (i e X^) can be interpreted as 
the variation in welfare from changes in the constraint that 
all the unprocessed product i in set X purchased from member 
patrons are transformed into final products. Finally the 
lagrange multiplier X31 can be interpreted as the contribution 
of fixed factor i in set Fg to marginal welfare, that is the 
variation in welfare from changes in one of the cooperative's 
fixed factor. 
62 
In condition 13, the price of jth output sold to the 
cooperative by members is used as the instrument variable. 
The term 
may be interpreted as the marginal variation in welfare from 
the changes of indirect utility functions of members caused by 
a variation in the jth price, which is equivalent to the sum 
of weighted supply that members sell to the cooperative for j 
e Xc- The term 
1: Pjof 
ieYc 
represents total collective revenue of cooperative's farm 
input business, since the revenue is received by the 
cooperative for providing farm inputs to the member patrons. 
Therefore, the term 
V n ^  S/' Sp, 
can be interpreted as the marginal variation in total 
collective revenues (TCR) to the cooperative arising from 
shifts in factor demand induced by jth price. This effect was 
represented by Royer as: 
TM 
^ dTCR ogj 
k, dqf dpj 
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Similarly, the term 
iexe dq™ ^Pj 
^ dTCC dgf 
may be interpreted as the marginal variation in total 
collective costs (TCC) from the jth product and all other 
products in set Xc arising from output shifts which are 
induced by a change in the jth price. The term 
V D = T a?/ 
6^ ' aPj 8g/ dpj 
can be interpreted as the marginal variation in total 
collective revenues arising from shifts in consumption goods 
demand induced by jth price. The term 
can be interpreted as the variation in total member patronage 
refunds (TPR) from shifts in output supply, factor demand, and 
consumption good demand induced by a variation in the jth 
price. Therefore, the second and third lines of the condition 
can be interpreted as variation in welfare through the 
variation in total member patronage refunds and the change of 
net savings from variation of total collective revenue and 
total collective cost, all induced by dpj. 
The term 
1 (V -2Î- iSL) 
' & a?/ 
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in the fourth line can be interpreted as the marginal 
variation in welfare from the production of the products in 
set Xc, set Yc, and set arising from changes in the 
quantities demanded or supplied which are induced by dpj. We 
can rewrite this term as: 
- JlK. Y 
60" % ag/ apj 
The term 
IT A .Agf iSe 
in the fifth line represents the variation in welfare that is 
caused by changes in cooperative's use of members' output due 
to changes in farm output which are generated by a change in 
price paid to producers. That is, the variation in welfare 
from the transformation of products in set to final 
products arising from a change in the quantities supplied 
which are induced by dpj. 
If the cooperative offers a positive price for the jth 
product in set X^, the following equality must be satisfied 
for a maximum: 
dL _ dW 
^Pj 6 ^Pj 
^ dW r , BMI dTCR ^ dMI dTCR ^Qi 
àMI A, arCR agf dp J A, dgT dp J 
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dMI dTCC dq™ _ y, SMI dTPR . 
~ A, àTCC dqj" dpj ~ dTPR gg™ dp^ 
30' & dq/ dpj 
+ T -^^ = 0 
agf 3Pj 
where MI is cooperative's money income.' This is equivalent to 
stating that, for a maximum, the sum of: 
a) the marginal variation in welfare from the change of 
indirect utility functions of members induced by dpj, which is 
equivalent to the sum of weighted supply that members sell to 
the cooperative for j e Xc, plus 
b) the marginal variation in welfare through the change 
of money income to the cooperative from the changes in total 
member patronage refunds, and total collective revenues, total 
collective costs due to change in the quantities supplied and 
demanded induced by dpj, plus 
c) the marginal variation in welfare arising from changes 
of cooperative's production induced by dpj, plus 
d) the marginal variation in welfare from the 
transformation of products in set Xc to final product arising 
from a change in the quantities supplied induced by dpj 
must equal zero. 
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In condition 14, the price of jth input purchased by the 
member patrons from the cooperative is used as the instrument 
variable. The interpretation of this condition is similar to 
the interpretation of condition 13. The first line of the 
condition can be interpreted as the marginal variation in 
welfare from the change of indirect utility functions of 
members caused by a change in the jth price in set Yc, which 
is equivalent to the sum of weighted demand that members buy 
from the cooperative for j e Y^. The second and third lines 
of the condition can be interpreted as the marginal variation 
in welfare through the change of total member patronage 
refunds and net saving from the change of total collective 
revenue and total collective cost from shifts in output 
supply, factor demand, and consumption good demand induced by 
a change in the jth price. The fourth line of the condition 
can be interpreted as the marginal variation in welfare from 
the production of the products in set X^, set Y^, and set Zg 
arising from changes in the quantities demanded or supplied 
which are induced by a change in the jth price in set Y^. The 
fifth line of the condition represents the marginal variation 
in welfare that caused by changes in cooperative's use of 
member's output due to change of farm input demand which are 
generated by change in the price received from members. 
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If the cooperative offers a positive price for the jth 
product in set Yc/ the following equality must be satisfied 
for a maximum: 
dL _ ^  dW 
^Pj hk ^Pj 
§E. [x ( y dq™ ^ yy dMI dTCR A, àTCR dgf dpj A, dTCR dgf dp^  dMI 
dMI dTCC dq™ _ ^  dMI dTPR dq™ 
k, dTCC dpj ~ ^  dTPR ag™ dPj 
dW_ 601 dqf 
60^ iec ôg/ dp J 
A, dgj" ^Pj 
This is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the sum of: 
a) the marginal variation in welfare from the change of 
indirect utility functions of members induced by dpj, which is 
equivalent to the sum of weighted demand that members buy from 
the cooperative for j e Y^, plus 
b) the marginal variation in welfare through the change 
of money income of the cooperative from the changes in total 
member patronage refunds and total collective revenues, and 
total collective costs due to change in the quantities 
supplied and demanded induced by dpj, plus 
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c) the marginal variation in welfare arising from changes 
of cooperative's production induced by dpj, plus 
d) the marginal variation in welfare from the 
transformation of products in se to final product arising 
from a change in the quantities supplied induced by dpj 
must equal zero. 
In condition 15, the price of jth consumption good 
purchased from the cooperative by the member and nonmember 
patrons is used as the instrument variable. The first line of 
the condition can be interpreted as the marginal variation in 
welfare from the change of indirect utility function of 
members caused by a change in the jth price in set Z^, which 
is equivalent to the sum of weighted demand that members buy 
from the cooperative for j e The second and third lines 
of the condition can be interpreted as the marginal variation 
in welfare through the change of total member patronage 
refunds and net savings from the change of total collective 
revenue and total collective cost from shifts in output 
supply, factor demand, and consumption good demand induced by 
a change in the jth price in set Z^. The fourth line of the 
condition can be interpreted as the marginal variation in 
welfare from production of the products in set X^, set Y^, and 
set Zc arising from changes in the quantities demanded and 
supplied which are induced by a change in the jth price in set 
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Zc» The fifth line of the condition represents the marginal 
variation in welfare that caused by changes in cooperatives 
use of members• output due to changes of consumption good 
demands which are generated by change in the jth price paid to 
cooperative. 
If the cooperative offers a positive price for the jth 
product in set Z^, the following equality must be satisfied 
for a maximum: 
dL _ ^  
dPj M ^Pj 
+ [t  ( dTCR dq™ ^ „ dMI dTCR 
dMI A, dTCR SgJ" A, dTCR QgT dpj 
dMI dTCC dq™ _ ^  Qm I dTPR dqj" 
~ A, dTCC apj " ^  dTPR 3gTM 
^ dW yv 6$^ dqj^ 
Ac ôg/ dp^  
dgj" 
This is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the sum of: 
a) the marginal variation in welfare from the change of 
indirect utility functions of members induced by dpj, which is 
equivalent to the sum of weighted demand that members buy from 
the cooperative for j e Z^, plus 
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b) the marginal variation in welfare through the change 
of money income of the cooperative from the changes in total 
member patronage refunds and total collective revenues, and 
total collective costs due to change in the quantities 
supplied and demanded induced by dpj, plus 
c) the marginal variation in welfare arising from changes 
of cooperative's production induced by dpj, plus 
d) the marginal variation in welfare from the 
transformation of products in set to final product arising 
from a change in the quantities supplied induced by dpj 
must equal zero. 
In condition 16, the term 
dPj 
h 
is the marginal cost to the cooperative and the term 
1 
is the marginal variation in the welfare function due to 
change of the cooperative revenue through change in the amount 
of jth consumption good handled by the cooperative. 
Therefore, if cooperative purchase jth consumption good in set 
W, for a maximum, the marginal variation in the welfare due 
to change of cooperative's cost to purchase the consumption 
good induced by dqj, multiplied by t, must equal the marginal 
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variation in the welfare due to change of cooperative's 
revenue induced by dqj. 
In condition 17, if cooperative produces a positive 
quantity of the jth product in set U, this condition must be 
satisfied as an equality. The term 
dp. 
P' * "'it 
is the marginal revenue to the cooperative and the term 
1 agr, 
is the marginal variation in the welfare due to change of the 
product cost through the change of cooperative's volume of 
production. Therefore, for a maximum, the marginal variation 
in the welfare due to change of cooperative's revenue from 
producing product j in set U induced by dqj, multiplied by T, 
must equal the marginal variation in the welfare due to change 
of cooperative's production cost induced by dqj. 
In condition 18, the first line of the condition can be 
interpreted as variation in welfare from the change of 
indirect utility functions of members caused by a variation in 
the quantity of the jth club good which.cooperative provides 
to members. The club good does not enter members' direct 
utility functions but increases levels of outputs from each 
combination of inputs, and increases profits, hence increases 
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consumption expenditures. The second line of the condition 
can be interpreted as variation in welfare through the change 
of total member patronage refunds and net saving from the 
change of total collective revenue and total collective cost 
from shifts in output supply, factor demand, and consumption 
good demand induced by a variation in the jth club good which 
cooperative provided. The third line of the condition can be 
interpreted as the variation in welfare from the production of 
the products in set arising from changes in the quantities 
demanded or supplied which are induced by a variation in the 
jth club good. The fourth line of the condition represents 
the variation in welfare that is caused by changes in 
cooperative's use of member's output due to change of farm 
input demand which are generated by change in the jth club 
good. If the cooperative provides jth club good in set G, for 
a maximum, the sum of: 
a) the marginal variation in welfare from the change of 
indirect utility functions of members induced by dqj, plus 
b) the marginal variation in welfare through the change 
of money income to the cooperative from the changes in total 
member patronage refunds and total collective revenues, and 
total collective costs due to change in the quantities 
supplied and demanded induced by dqj, plus 
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c) the marginal variation in welfare from the production 
change of the products in set arising from changes in the 
quantities supplied which are induced by dqj, plus 
d) the marginal variation in welfare caused by changes in 
cooperative's use of members' outputs due to change of from 
input demanded induced by dqj 
must equal zero. 
In condition 19, the term 
3* 
Sqij 
is the variation in the welfare function of the cooperative 
from a change in the quantity of the ith factor of set used 
to produce output j in the cooperative (dq^) . X;, can be 
interpreted as the variation in the welfare function of the 
cooperative from a change in the amount of unprocessed product 
j used in the cooperative. Thus, condition 19 implies that, 
if qjj is positive, the variation in the welfare function of 
the cooperative from dq^ must be equal for all j . 
In condition 20, if the cooperative uses a positive 
quantity of the ith input in set V in the production of the 
jth product in set U, Y, G, this condition is satisfied as an 
equality. The term 
dp. 
* "'-ai, 
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is the marginal input cost to the cooperative of using the ith 
variable input and the term 
' dgj 
can be interpreted as the marginal variation in the welfare 
from the change in the guantity of input i used in the 
production of output j by the cooperative induced by dg^. 
Therefore, for a maximum, the marginal variation in the 
welfare due to change of cooperative's cost from a change due 
to use jth input induced by dqj multiplied by r must equal the 
marginal variation in the welfare due to change in amount of 
cooperative's jth product in set Y, U, G induced by dgy. 
The condition 21 can be interpreted as stating that 
cooperative's marginal value product of using ith fixed input 
in producing jth output equals the imputed value or shadow 
price of the ith fixed factor. This result implies that the 
cooperative's marginal value product of using ith fixed factor 
must be equal for all j. Condition 22 through 25 are just 
restatements of the constraints of the model. Condition 22 is 
constraint from the spending of net saving and 23 is the 
cooperative's production constraint. Condition 24 and 25 are 
the constraints from that all the unprocessed products in set 
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Xc purchased from member patrons are transferred into final 
products and that all fixed factors of productions are fixed 
in short run. 
The Impact of the Rate of Reserve Funds 
In order to look at the impact of the rate of reserve 
funds, we can apply the envelope theorem. The envelope 
theorem concerns the rate of change of the optimal value of 
the objective function itself when a parameter changes. 
4^  = XqNS  ^ 0 
d x  "  
since ^  = 0 
dx 
That is, W is not function of T. Equality is satisfied when NS 
equals zero. If Xq > 0, the result implies that a higher value 
of T benefits the members. That is, lower a benefits members. 
It is possible that a higher value of a would provide larger 
future benefits to members at the expense of current benefits. 
But, in this study I deal with only current period's problem 
rather than dynamic multi-period's problem. 
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CHAPTER 4. SIMPLIFICATION OF THE MODEL 
The optimality conditions to maximize the welfare 
function of the cooperative were presented in chapter 3. 
Further insight into those conditions is provided in this 
chapter by considering simplified models. First, we consider 
a single product consumer cooperative and then a single 
product marketing cooperative, after that we will consider 
single product supply cooperative. 
Single Product Consumer Cooperative 
This cooperative provides its patrons a single 
consumption good which cooperative produces. The cooperative 
does not market the products produced by the member patrons. 
And the cooperative does not supply its patrons with any 
inputs. In addition, the cooperative must purchase some of 
its inputs from sources outside the cooperative. 
Given these assumptions, only Kuhn-Tucker condition 15, 
16, 20 through 23 are relevant. Of those, the interpretations 
of all but 15 are similar to those of the general model in 
chapter 3. Condition 15 can be rewritten as: 
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The term 
_d^   ^
hk ^Pz 
can be interpreted as the variation in welfare from the change 
of indirect utility functions of members caused by the change 
of the price of the consumption good. 
If we assume each member patron's utility function has 
the same weight and marginal utility of income for each member 
is same, then 
neA °Pz neA 
where ô = 
If 5 = 1, then the variation in welfare from the changes in 
utility of members induced by dp^ equals the sum of members 
consumption of the good purchased from the cooperative. 
The term 
T T , _ "yz dg, 
can be rewritten as; 
where 
Pz + 
agr. Z 
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is the change of total collective revenue to the cooperative 
arising from the change of quantity demanded which is induced 
by the dp^. Thus, the term 
^0 T(gr,' + p,-^ ) - r 3p, ' ap, / 
can be interpreted as the variation in welfare through the 
change of net saving and total member patronage refunds from 
the change of total collective revenue to the cooperative from 
shifts in the consumption good demand induced by dp,. 
The term 
. 6$ 5g/ 
dgl 
can be interpreted as the variation in welfare from production 
of product Z arising from changes in the quantities demanded, 
which are induced by dp^. 
Thus, if the cooperative offers a positive price of the 
consumption good, for a maximum, the sum of: 
a) the variation in welfare from the changes in indirect 
utility functions of members' induced by dp^, plus 
b) the variation in welfare through the change of money 
income of the cooperative from change in total member 
patronage refunds and total collective revenue due to change 
in the quantity demanded induced by dpj,, plus 
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c) the variation in welfare arising from changes of 
cooperative's production induced by dp,, 
must equal zero. 
Single Product Marketing Cooperative 
In this model, the cooperative markets one product 
produced by the member patrons. This product is used by the 
cooperative in the production of several outputs, each of 
which is sold outside the cooperative. The cooperative does 
not supply its patrons with any inputs or consumption goods; 
all of these must be purchased from sources outside the 
cooperative. In addition, the cooperative must purchase some 
of its inputs from sources outside the cooperative. 
Given these assumption, only Kuhn-Tucker condition 13, 
17, 18, 20, and 21 through 25 are relevant. Of these the 
interpretations of all but 13 are similar to those of the 
general model in chapter 3. Condition 13 can be rewritten as; 
ÔL _ dff 1 / - r 
dPx hi ^P. 
- r 
dp^ dp^ J 
where X represents the product marketed by the cooperative, 
In lagrange function (2.1), let 
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gPi'îi - E/i'ïi - f =« then, H > 0. 
Therefore, maximizing M (a member's profit) is identical to 
maximizing the member's utility. When each member patron's 
utility function has the same weight, and each member patron's 
utility function is identical, maximizing the welfare function 
is identical to maximizing sum of individual member's profit 
functions. Then, this simplified model is similar to Royer's. 
If we ignore the dividends on stocks, the net savings' 
restriction can be rewritten by replacing Zlpr^ in by TNS. 
Then, 
If we rewrite this condition as; 
X 
The term 
Px + % 
represents the marginal revenue of the member patrons from 
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product X. Thus, 
a?/ 
- «  /  
represents the increase in total revenue of the member patrons 
arising from the output shift induced by the variation in the 
price which the cooperative offers for product X. The term 
represents the increase in the total cost of the member 
patrons due to the shifts in factor use which are induced by 
dPx. The term 
Pk + gJ 
also represents the marginal factor cost to the cooperative. 
Therefore, the term 
- X 'p.  a/  ^
dPx 
can be interpreted as the marginal variation in the profits of 
the member patrons due to change of net savings due to change 
of cooperative's factor cost from a change in the quantity of 
X used in production by the cooperative, induced by dp*. The 
term 
X. a* 
dg, T X 
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is interpreted as the marginal variation in the profits of the 
member patrons arising from a change in the quantity of x used 
in production by the cooperative. This is equivalent to the 
marginal revenue product to the cooperative from product X 
multiplied by T. Thus, the term 
1 agj apx 
can be interpreted as equivalent to the increase in the total 
revenue of the cooperative from use of product X arising from 
the change in the quantities supplied which are induced by dp*, 
multiplied by t. The term 
, dgj 
: apx 
is interpreted as the marginal variation in total revenue of 
the member patrons caused by changes in cooperatives•s use of 
members' output due to changes of farm output which are 
generated by change in price paid to producers. That is, it 
is the marginal variation in total revenue of the member 
patrons from the transformation of products to final products 
arising from a change in the quantities supplied which are 
induced by dp^. 
Thus, for a maximum, the sum of: 
a) the increase in the total revenue of the member 
patrons from the output shift induced by dp*, plus 
83 
b) the increase in the total revenue of the cooperative 
from use of product X arising from changes in the quantity 
s u p p l i e d  w h i c h  a r e  i n d u c e d  b y  d p * ,  m u l t i p l i e d  b y  T ,  
must equal the sum of: 
c) the increase in the total cost of the member patrons 
due to the shifts in factor use which are induced by dp*, plus 
d) the increase in the total cost of the cooperative from 
product X arising from the changes in the quantities supplied 
which are induced by dp,, multiplied by T, plus 
e) the marginal variation in total revenue of the member 
patrons from the transformation of members' products to final 
products arising from a change in the quantities supplied 
which are induced by dp*. 
If the rate of allocation to reserve funds is zero, that 
is, T = 1, the marginal revenue to the member patrons and the 
marginal factor cost to the cooperative cancel. Then, for a 
maximum, the marginal increase in the cost of the member 
patrons from producing the product should equal its marginal 
revenue product to the cooperative. 
The argument that the optimal quantity is that quantity 
at which the marginal cost of the product equals its marginal 
revenue product in the cooperative can be made in terms of 
producers' and consumers' surpluses. The producers' surplus 
can be defined as the difference between what the producers of 
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the product receive and what they would be willing to receive 
for a given quantity, a measure of the net benefit they derive 
from selling the product. 
The proprietary firm, serving as a marketing agency, 
might be interested in maximizing the consumer's surplus 
alone. This would be accomplished by operating at the point 
at which the marginal revenue product curve intersects the 
marginal factor cost curve instead of where it intersects the 
marginal cost. However, the cooperative attempts to maximize 
the sum of the producers' and consumer's surpluses. 
If the supply curve facing the cooperative is the 
marginal cost curve, the cooperative maximize the profits of 
its member patrons by setting a price equal to the marginal 
revenue product of the product. Unless the marginal revenue 
product is equal to the average revenue product, this price by 
itself will not result in all of the producer surplus being 
distributed to the member patrons. A price equal to the 
average revenue product would by itself result in all of the 
producer surplus being distributed to the member patrons, but 
it would not result in a maximum. The cooperative can set a 
price equal to the marginal revenue product and still 
distribute all of the producer surplus through the use of 
patronage refunds. 
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Single Product Supply Cooperative 
In this model, the cooperative supplies member patrons 
with a single factor of production. This factor is used by 
the member patrons in their production of several outputs, 
each of which is sold outside the cooperative. The 
cooperative does not market any of the outputs for its 
patrons, and does not supply any consumption goods to its 
patrons. In addition, the cooperative must purchase from 
outside the cooperative inputs which it uses in the production 
of the factor. 
Given this assumption, only Kuhn-Tucker condition 14, 20, 
21 through 25 are relevant. Of these the interpretations of 
all but 14 are similar to those of the general model in 
chapter 3. Condition 14 can be rewritten: 
dL _ Y" 4. \ 
+ Py-TTT ) - ^  
'W/ Tp: 
3g; 
where y represents the factor supplied by the cooperative. 
We can define a welfare function which gives the same 
weight to each member's utility function, and each member 
patron's utility function is identical. Then, maximizing the 
welfare function is identical to maximizing the sum of 
individual member's profit functions, which is similar to 
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single product marketing cooperative model. The net saving 
restriction can be rewritten by replacing ZLPR^ in S7R„ by TNS. 
Thus, the condition is 
The term 
dQi 
3Pv E _ iex„ 
represents the increase in total revenue to the member patrons 
arising from the output shifts which are induced by the change 
in Py. The term 
dPy 
represents the marginal factor cost to the member patrons of 
factor y. Thus, 
represents the increase in the total cost of the member 
patrons from shift in factor use induced by the change in the 
price the cooperative charges for y. The term 
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also represents the marginal revenue to the cooperative. 
Therefore, 
can be interpreted as the marginal variation in the profits of 
the member patrons due to change of patronage refunds through 
the change of cooperative's net saving due to change of 
cooperative's total revenue from a change in the quantity of Y 
demanded by the members, induced by dpy. 
The term 
agy 
is interpreted as the marginal variation in the profits of the 
member patrons arising from a change in the quantity of y 
produced by the cooperative. This is equivalent to the 
marginal cost to the cooperative of factor y multiplied by T . 
Thus, the term 
àgy 
dQy dpy 
can be interpreted as equivalent to the increase in the total 
cost to the cooperative of factor y arising from changes in 
the quantities demanded which are induced by the change in Py, 
multiplied by r. 
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Thus, for a maximum, the sum of: 
a) the increase in the total revenue of the member 
patrons from the output shifts induced by dpy, plus 
b) the increase in the total revenue of the cooperative 
from factor y arising from changes in the quantities demanded 
which are induced by DPY, multiplied by T, 
must equal the sum of; 
c) the increase in the total cost of the member patrons 
due to the shifts in factor use which are induced by dpy, plus 
d) the increase in the total cost of the cooperative from 
factor y arising from the changes in the quantities demanded 
which are induced by DPY, multiplied by T. 
If the rate of allocation to reserve fund is zero, that 
is, T = 1, for a maximum, the cooperative's marginal cost of 
supplying the factor should equal the marginal increase in the 
revenue of the member patrons from using it. 
As in the model of the single product marketing 
cooperative, the argument that the optimal quantity is that 
quantity at which the marginal value product of the factor 
equals its marginal cost can be made in terms of producer's 
and consumers' surpluses. With the exception that the 
producer is the cooperative and the consumers are the member 
patrons, the argument is identical to that used in the model 
of the single product marketing cooperative. 
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This result is identical to that found by Enke in his 
model of a consumer cooperative. He suggested that a consumer 
cooperative which took into account its consumers as owners as 
well as patrons should set the price it charges its members 
for a particular product equal to the marginal cost of 
producing it. A proprietary firm, serving as a supplier, 
would maximize its producer's surplus (profit) by operating at 
the point at which the marginal cost curve intersects the 
marginal revenue curve instead of the marginal value product 
curve or demand curve. 
If the demand curve facing the cooperative is the 
marginal value product curve, the cooperative maximizes the 
profits of its member patrons by setting a price equal to the 
marginal cost of the factor. Unless the marginal cost is 
equal to the average cost, this price by itself results in all 
of the consumer surplus being distributed to the member 
patrons, but it would not result in a maximum. The 
cooperative can set a price equal to the marginal cost and 
still distribute all of the consumer surplus through the use 
of patronage refunds. 
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CHAPTER 5. PRODUCTION AND PRICING DECISION UNDER 
PRICE UNCERTAINTY 
Introduction 
Price uncertainty is created by uncertainties about 
future total supplies and demand for inputs and outputs which 
are determined by individual farm decisions. Mismatches of 
aggregate supply and demand similarly affect prices and create 
price uncertainty. 
Marketing contracts are written agreements between 
cooperatives and their members stating the rights and duties 
of both parties regarding how products will be marketed or 
purchased for a specified period of time. Cooperative's 
forward contract provides the potential for improving macro 
coordination if a sufficient market share can be included and 
the problems of contingency contracting can be solved. 
Cooperatives have limited capacity to guarantee forward 
prices. A cooperative can not offer a guaranteed price 
because the price received by a member must depend on the 
performance of the cooperative. 
However, they have potential to influence production 
plans through providing information to members, contracting 
with members, and to influence downstream market channel 
participants through collective bargaining, contracting, and 
promotion. A cooperative representing a large portion of 
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production could improve the match of aggregate production 
supply and demand, thus contributing to price stability and 
coordination. 
An lOF (investor owned firm) offering fixed prices either 
on a spot or forward contract market may assume considerable 
risk due to uncertain future price movements. In a 
cooperative, members assume this risk and the price of the raw 
product is more like an internal transfer price than a 
transaction across a market. Thus, farmers have the 
opportunity of benefitting from future favorable price 
movement because of patronage refunds. 
A long established tenet of cooperative theory is that a 
monopoly held by an open-membership marketing cooperative can 
not exploit consumers. The reason is the cooperative conveys 
the benefits of its high selling prices to its producers via 
some combination of high firm prices and patronage refunds. 
The producers respond to the high returns by increasing 
output, and consumer prices fall to where they would be with 
cooperatives. 
There is a widespread notion throughout agriculture that 
the only way to achieve group bargaining market power is to 
control supply; and likewise, there is a mistaken notion that 
unless you do control supply you do not have bargaining power. 
Both notions are wrong, since market power comes in various 
shapes and sizes (Cooperative Bargaining pp.130 - 131). If 
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bargaining power is so successful as to raise farm prices 
sharply there will be a tendency to increase output. The 
effect to increase price would be self-defeating unless supply 
were limited. Can and will farmers impose strong production 
restraints upon themselves ? The cooperative association is 
not a horizontal integration of its members' profit centers, 
and members act independently except as they have agreed to 
own firms jointly or have negotiated to act collectively. The 
cooperative association has the potential to affect horizontal 
coordination, as in the case of a bargaining cooperative, but 
market power requires a mechanism of collective action to 
control the purchase or production decisions of independent 
members. But members remain independent. It is important to 
distinguish farmer collective action through cooperatives to 
achieve improved macro coordination from collective action 
designed to extract monopoly advantage. 
Farmer patrons receive many benefits when their 
cooperatives use contracts. Members like contacts especially 
because they assure a market for their products. Contracts 
also give producers an important advantage in securing credit, 
because loan officers recognize that a contract reduces risk 
and provides a market at reasonable prices. A cooperative 
could act as the farmers agent, thus reducing search costs and 
uncertainty. Cooperatives may reduce concentration in the 
markets of a farm commodity subsector by their entry into the 
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subsector. Even the threat of entry may change behavior of 
existing firms in concentrated markets. Further,enforced 
contracts help to solve the free-rider problem. 
Cooperatives themselves can also improve their business 
by using contracts. First, they can reduce or eliminate cost 
associated with annual solicitation of patronage. Also, 
cooperatives can offer forward contracts with quantity, 
quality, and schedule guarantees; and they can acquire 
supplies and capital at more favorable rates and prices 
because of image of reliability and the stability created by 
producer contracts. Contracts enable cooperatives to plan for 
the best combination of resources to minimise costs. 
Contracts are not, however, appropriate for all 
situations; and even when they are appropriate, cooperatives 
need to make efforts to minimize their potential weaknesses. 
For example, some potential members may.be hesitant to make 
the type of binding commitment that the contract requires. 
One of the greatest drawbacks for farmers who sign contracts, 
particularly for those producing bulk commodities such as 
grain and oilseeds, is the loss of freedom to use other 
marketing alternatives. In addition, a cooperative's 
management may become careless because it may take the nearly 
guaranteed volume for granted. However, cooperatives must 
keep in mind that contracts are no substitute for efficiency. 
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No contract will hold members together indefinitely unless it 
produces expected benefits. 
Risk and uncertainty influence the efficiency of 
resource use in agriculture and the decision making processes 
of farmers. Farmers may reduce price uncertainty by selecting 
enterprises with a low expected price variability. Forward 
contracting prior to harvest also introduces some flexibility 
in marketing. A cooperative can offer forward contracts. A 
cooperative's forward contract provides the potential for 
improving macro-coordination. However, cooperatives have 
limited capacity to guarantee forward prices. In order to 
continue the cooperative's business, cooperatives also need to 
consider the market price uncertainty, even though they may 
have better information about the demand than individual 
members. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide the decision 
rules to the cooperative's managers under price uncertainty 
when they offer forward contracts to their members. 
Development of the Model 
The objectives of cooperatives are to increase members' 
profits and/ or decrease the members' risk. For this study we 
assume that the cooperative purchases unprocessed products 
(set X) from member patrons under forward contract, and 
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supplies them with variable inputs (set Y) which they use in 
production. The cooperative determines the forward prices it 
will pay for purchased unprocessed products and the prices it 
charges for the sale of variable inputs. The cooperative also 
purchases variable inputs (set V) from sellers outside the 
cooperative and sells finished products (set U) to buyers 
outside the cooperative. We assume the prices of the variable 
inputs that the cooperative purchases from sellers outside are 
not random, but the prices of the finished products which the 
cooperative sells to buyers outside the cooperative are 
random. We assume there is no patronage refund for the 
variable inputs which members use in production and purchase 
from cooperatives, because input price is known when the 
member purchases the input from the cooperative. The 
cooperative can provide these variable inputs at the 
cooperative's cost. 
Individual Member Decision 
Assume each individual member farm firm wishes to 
maximize its utility, which is 
U  =  E  ( u )  -  - J  v a r  ( ft ) 
In this study, cooperatives offer forward contract to members. 
Cooperatives can acquire supplies at more favorable prices 
because of the image of reliability creàted by producer 
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contracts. By having contracts, cooperatives can reduce 
procurement, assembly, and delivery costs. They can also 
carry out processing and other activities at minimum costs 
because their volume is known, and have potential advantage in 
gaining reliable information compared with a government agency 
or private firm if they were able to generate a sense of 
community among their members. In general, cooperatives also 
have better position than members to get information about the 
market. Therefore, members can reduce the risk from private 
treaty, pooling risk, and get advantages of cooperative's 
information, economies of scale, and various of cooperative's 
services. Cooperatives can provide the opportunity for the 
adjustment of supply throughout a year. Cooperatives store 
the products when the prices are low and sell the products 
when the prices improve. Such adjustment can be made by 
warehouse storage. Therefore, cooperatives contribute to 
stabilize the prices, hence reduce the variances of the 
prices. Thus, as long as the variance of per unit patronage 
refund is less than the variance of price for a particular 
product faced by members, members will sell all their 
production to cooperatives under contract. In this study, we 
assume members sell their entire production to cooperatives 
under contract. Thus, a member's profit defined as: 
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lex iey iex 
= E ?i - Z Pi?j - ^  
iex ier 
where X is the set of outputs produced by the members and sell 
to the cooperative, Y is the set of variable inputs purchased 
by the members from cooperative, F is the fixed cost, and r, is 
the per unit patronage refund; its expected value is assumed 
equal to zero. This patronage refund is similar to an 
unbiased basis in a futures market price. For simplicity, 
covariances of patronage refunds between items i and j are 
assumed equal to zero. Therefore, 
Eiii) = Y^PiQi - Y,PiQi - F 
iex ieY 
var ( 7t ) =  ^Qi a 
iex 
2 
Then, an individual member's utility function is: 
U = Y^PiQi - E Pi^ i - ^ - 4 E 
iex ieY ^ ieX 
where X is the member's level of risk aversion. An individual 
member's decision is to maximize his utility function subject 
to his production function and fixed inputs. The individual 
member's implicit production function is: 
QTf) = 0 
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Then, we can set up the lagrange function which will be 
represented as a maximization of a member's utility function 
subject to his constraints. This is given as: 
•C- = E - F - - g gjal^  
iex iey ^ lex 
+ E ^21 - <?i) 
ieF 
In this individual's problem, the decision variables are; 
qj i e X, Y. 
By solving the first and second-order conditions for 
maximizing this function, we can get the individual member's 
supply functions of farm outputs, demand functions of variable 
inputs, and indirect utility function, which are functions of 
P;^, Pi, X, F, and variances of patronage refunds. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the individual's problem 
are as follows: 
(26) for all j e X 
dL _ „c _ , „2 ^ 
dQj 
dL 
dgj 
Qj  ^ 0 
= p/- A + ;  0 
Qj = 0 
(27) for all j e Y 
dL 
dq. Qj = 0 
Qj  ^ 0 
(28) for all j e F 
dL 
dcfj <Jj = 0 
Qj ^  0 
(29) for Ml 
dL 
= (^Qx' 9y' ?f) 
(30) for j E F 
dL 
an 2j 
= Qj - Qj i: 0 
dL 
3^ 2; 
= 0 
\^ 2J  ^ 0 
100 
Before interpreting the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, it is 
useful to interpret the lagrange multipliers. The lagrange 
multiplier, can be interpreted as the imputed value or 
shadow price of <p (Royer, 37) . If i e X, 
- <  
can be interpreted as the member's marginal imputed cost of 
producing the ith product. On the other hand, if i e Y, 
can be interpreted as the marginal value product of the ith 
input to the member. The lagrange multiplier jUjj can be 
interpreted as the imputed value or shadow price of the ith 
fixed factor. 
Then, condition 26 can be rewritten as: 
pf - A. Qjol^ ^ -Hi gg 2 ^ 
The term on the left-hand side of the inequality is the price 
the member patron receives from the sale of product j in set X 
to the cooperative minus risk premium. The term on the right-
hand side is equal to the marginal cost of producing product 
j. Therefore, if the jth product is produced, for maximum 
utility, it should be produced up to the point at which the 
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marginal cost of producing it is equal to the price adjusted 
with risk premium. 
Condition 27 corresponds to the use of the jth variable 
input of production, purchased from the cooperative. 
Condition 27 can be rewritten as: 
P} ^ 1^ 1-^  
The term on the left-hand side of the inequality is the price 
the member patron pays the cooperative for input j in set Y. 
The term on the right-hand side is equal to the marginal value 
product of input j. Therefore, if the jth input is used, for 
maximum utility, it should be used up to the point at which 
its marginal value product is equal to its price. 
Condition 28 corresponds to the use of the fixed factor 
of production. Condition 29 is simply a restatement of the 
firm's production function. Condition 3 0 corresponds to the 
fixed factor constraints. 
Output supply functions and input demand functions for 
the member patron can be derived from the conditions. Output 
supply functions and input demand functions are function of 
parameters, the forward prices of farm products, the prices of 
inputs, the level of risk aversion, and variances of patronage 
refunds. These functions can be represented as: 
=  Q i ( P x >  P y >  > - /  O r )  i e x ,  Y  
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where is a vector of the forward prices of farm products in 
set X, Py is a vector of the prices of the variable inputs in 
set Y, X is the level of risk aversion, a} is a vector of 
variances of patronage refunds. 
Cooperative's Decision 
The cooperative's decision makers need to decide the 
prices of inputs, forward prices of farm product, the quantity 
of output to sell to outside buyers, and the quantity of 
inputs to buy from outside sellers. The objectives of the 
cooperatives are to give benefits to their members, not just 
maximize their profits. According to the individual member's 
utility function he tries to increase his profit but also to 
reduce his risk. Individual member's risk is measured by 
variance of profit which depends on variance of patronage 
refund. The variances of patronage refunds depend on the 
variance of cooperative's net saving. Therefore, the 
cooperative tries to increase sum of members' expected profits 
and to reduce the variance of net saving. Then, we can set 
the cooperative's welfare function as: 
fv^= - -^variNS) 
neN 2 
where is member n's expected profit, is cooperative's 
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level of risk aversion, and var(NS) is the variance of 
cooperatives net saving. 
The cooperative's decision maker tries to maximize the 
cooperative's welfare function subject to zero expected net 
saving, cooperative's production function and fixed input 
constraints. The cooperative's net saving is: 
NS = - fCC 
ieu i€V i€X leY 
where U is the set of the outputs produced by cooperative and 
sold to outside buyers, V is the set of the variable inputs 
used by cooperative and purchased from outside sellers, FCC is 
cooperative's fixed input cost. In the net saving equation, 
the only random variables are prices of the outputs in set U. 
For simplicity, covariances between product i's patronage 
refund and product j's patronage refund are assumed equal to 
zero. Cooperative's input prices are not random because input 
prices in set V are known when cooperative makes decisions 
about the prices of products in set X and Y. Then, 
E i N S )  =  ^  P i Q i  -  J 2 P i Q i  -  Y ^ P i Q i  +  ^ P i Q i  - F C C  
ieu iev iex ieY 
var (NS) = Y\ql o\ 
ieu 
where E(p) = p, 
CT;^  = variance of price of product i in set U. 
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The cooperative's production function is: 
^ ( Qfj i  Qyt  Qx' Qy ^ ) — 0  
The reason is one of the elements of the production 
function is that cooperative uses its resources to reduce 
Then, we can set up the lagrange function as: 
L  =  E f / ' î /  -  E f j » /  -  f E  
iex iey ieu 
+ Ho - FCC) 
ieu ie/ iex ley 
(Qt/ '  Oy Qx> Qy ^ I? ^ 
+ E (?7 - E 
iex lea. Y 
+ E ^^32 - E 
iefc jeu, Y 
The decision variables for this cooperative's problem are 
Pi" iex, 
Pi i e Y, 
q; i e U, 
CTj^ i e U, 
qy i e V, j e U, Y, 
qij i e F,, j e U, Y. 
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This model is different from Royer's model. His model assumed 
certainty. This study deals with price uncertainty which 
cooperatives meet when they sell their products to outside 
buyers. For simplicity, we ignore the cooperative's 
consumption goods businesses and the rates of allocation to 
reserve funds are not considered. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the cooperative's problem 
are as follows: 
(31) for all j e X 
dL 
ap/ 
( 
= (1 - Po) 
E 1^ 1 8$ ag/ 
ag/ 
ïëx dpf ^ - ( 1 - M-o ) E jP-i ier 
ag/ 
ap/ 
iex.y ÔQi dpj  
iex OPj 
Pf  ^ 0 
(32) for all j e Y 
dL 
dPj = (1 - IJ-O ) E ~ (1 " <?/ + E lex i6Y ag/ dPj )  
6$ ag/ 
iex'.Y ^ 6g/ aPj 
E 1^ 1 
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= 0 
dp^ 
PJ ^ 0 
(33) for all jeu 
2r -
= - AcOjOj àQj 
àpj_ 
dg.  + Ho Pj + 
= 0 
dgj 
gj  ^ 0 
(34) for all j e U 
lex lex. Y / 
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dL 
d a /  '  
o = 0 
^ 0 
(35) for all i e V, j e U, Y 
9ij ^  0 
(36) for all i e Fc j e U, Y 
a%j ° 9 ^ " i j  
?jj ^  0 
(37) for Mo 
dL 
^M'o ieu 
(38) for Ml 
= Pi<^i -  T> Pl^l  ~ T,  Pi^i  + T,Pi^i  -  FCC = 0 
iev iex iey 
dL 
ôHi 
Qy ^F q'  [7 ) ~ ® 
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(39) for M2i» i e X 
(40) for Msi/ i 6 Fc 
P3i 2 0 
Before we interpret the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we need 
to interpret the lagrange multipliers. Most of the lagrange 
multipliers in this case have the same meaning as in the 
cooperative's model under certainty. The lagrange multiplier 
IjLq can be interpreted as the variation in total private profits 
(TPP) due to autonomous change in cooperative's expected net 
savings, or 
dW ^ dTPP 
a ( -  FCC) di-  FCC) 
where FCC is the constant term in the constraint of expected 
net savings. Thus, /ig is equivalent to marginal variation in 
total private profits of the unit of cooperative's money 
income. 
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In condition 31, the forward price of jth output sold to 
the cooperative by members is used as the instrument variable. 
Expression 31 and 32 are deterministic, variances of refunds 
do not appear in them. The term 
''''S""# 
is marginal variation in total private revenue (TPR) from the 
jth product and all other products in set X arising from 
output shifts which are induced by dpj^. This effect can be 
represented by 
ys dTPR 
iex dql  Bpj 
This term is also marginal variation in total collective 
revenue to the cooperative induced by dpj*^, which reduces the 
net savings. Therefore, the term 
(1 - Ho) 9/ + 
I iex dpj  )  
is marginal variation in total private revenue after adjusting 
for the effects on the cooperative's net saving. 
Similarly, the term 
EP.FC iey dpj  
can be interpreted as marginal variation in total private cost 
(TPC) arising from shifts in factor use which are induced by 
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dpj^ . This effect can be represented by 
dTPC 
ley dql  dpj  
This term is also marginal variation in total collective 
revenue to the cooperative induced by dpj^, which increases the 
cooperative's net saving. Therefore, the term 
is marginal variation in total private cost after adjusting 
for the effects on the cooperative's net saving. The term 
iex.Y ^ dql  dpf 
is interpreted by Royer (p. 90) as the variation in the 
profits of the member patrons from the production of the 
products in set X, and/ or purchases of products in set Y 
arising from changes in the quantities demanded or supplied 
which are induced by dpj^ . 
The term 
iex opj  
represents the variation in the profits of the members from 
the changes in use of products in set X to final product 
arising from a change in the quantities supplied, which are 
induced by dpj^ . 
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Therefore, if pj*^ > 0, this condition is equivalent to 
stating that, for a maximum, the sum of: 
a) the variation in total private profits arising from 
input and output shifts, after adjusting for the effects on 
the cooperative's net saving, induced by dpj^, plus 
b) the variation in the profits of the members arising 
from changes in the cooperative's production induced by dp^, 
plus 
c) the variation in the profits of the members from the 
transformation of products in set X to final products arising 
from a change in the quantities supplied induced by dpj^ , 
must equal zero. 
Condition 32 can be interpreted the same as condition 31 
except that condition 32 measures the influences of the 
variation of a input price. 
In condition 33, the quantity of the jth product in set U 
is used as the instrument variable. In contrast with 31 and 
32, condition 33 contains measures of price variability. The 
term 
-
can be interpreted as the cooperative's risk premium. The 
term 
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is change in expected net savings. Therefore, 
can be interpreted as the marginal variation in the expected 
profits of the members due to the change in the cooperative's 
expected net savings. The term 
can be interpreted as the marginal variation in the expected 
profits of the members arising from a change in the quantity 
of the output produced by the cooperative (dqj, j e U) . 
Thus, if the cooperative produces a positive quantity of 
the jth product in set U, the condition 33 is equivalent to 
stating that, for a maximum, the marginal variation in the 
expected profits of the members by the change in the expected 
net savings minus the cooperative's risk premium must equal 
the marginal variation in the profits of the members arising 
from a change in the quantity of the output produced by the 
cooperative. 
In condition 34, the variance of the price of output j 
which cooperative produces, is an instrument variable. It 
reflects the cooperative's use of resources in searching for, 
and providing to members, information on markets, in 
bargaining and contracting and in other activities that reduce 
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variances of prices of outputs. The term 
is marginal variation in the members expected profits due to 
changes of production in set X and changes of input demand 
through the changes of patronage refunds induced by , after 
adjusting for the effects on the cooperative's net saving. 
The term 
^ h i k y  agTj 0a,/ 00/ 
is the variation in the expected profits of the members from 
the changes of cooperative's production arising from changes 
in the quantities supplied and/ or demanded due to changes of 
patronage refunds which is induced by dCTj^. The term \ 
indicates the amount of cooperative's risk premium. The term 
can be interpreted as the marginal variation in the expected 
profits of the members arising from a change in cooperative 
production from a change in the variance of price of the 
output j. 
Therefore, if the cooperative use its resources to reduce 
the variance of its output j's price, the condition 34 is 
114 
equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the sum of: 
a) the marginal variation in the profits of members after 
adjusting for the effects on the cooperative's net saving due 
to changes of output supplies and input demands through the 
changes of the variances of patronage refunds induced by daj^ , 
plus 
b) the marginal variation in the profits of the members 
from the changes of cooperative's production arising from 
changes in the quantities supplied in set X and/ or demanded 
in set Y due to changes of the variances of patronage refunds 
induced by 6.a^ , 
must equal to the sum of : 
C) change of cooperative's risk premium, plus 
d) the marginal variation in the expected profits of the 
members arising from a change in cooperative production due to 
change in the variance of price of the output j . 
The interpretations of condition 35 and 3 6 are same as 
the interpretation in general model except that 35 and 3 6 use 
the profits of the members instead of cooperative's welfare. 
Condition 38 is simply a restatement of the cooperative's 
production, condition 37, 39, and 40 are the restatements of 
the constraints of the model. 
Risk and uncertainty influence the efficiency of resource 
use in agriculture and the decision-making process of farmers 
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and cooperative's decision makers. However, the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions for their problems are vary complex. In addition, 
there is a great amount of information which is necessary to 
evaluate them. This suggests that the cooperative decision 
maker's task of maximizing the expected profits of the 
cooperative's member patrons is a difficult one. In fact, it 
is doubtful that a cooperative of any complexity will be able 
to fully attain the objective of maximizing the expected 
profits of its member patrons. 
Nevertheless, the optimality conditions presented here 
should be of value to the cooperative which is attempting to 
maximize its member patrons' expected profits even if it is 
not entirely successful in doing so. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
Some of the problems associated with Korean agricultural 
cooperative were discussed, and the relevant literature was 
reviewed to see how well it provided solutions. The purposes 
of this study were to introduce the idea that a farm 
cooperative is a decision unit in Korea, and to develop a 
short-run model of the cooperative which could be used to 
analyze its problems. 
In particular, an attempt was made to develop under 
certainty a normative-prescriptive model of a diversified 
multi-product marketing, supply inputs and consumption goods 
cooperative which served both member and nonmember patrons, 
and also develop a model of a multi-product marketing and 
supply cooperative under uncertainty. 
Development of the model under certainty began with the 
construction of a sub-model of a typical multi-product member 
patron. The typical member patron was assumed to maximize its 
utility functions. The typical member patron purchased its 
consumption goods and some of its inputs from the cooperative 
and marketed some of its outputs through the cooperative. The 
production of the member patron was augmented by the provision 
of club goods by the cooperatives. A similar sub-model of a 
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typical nonmember patron was also developed. The primary 
differences between this sub-model and that of the typical 
member patron were that the nonmember patron purchased only 
some of its consumption goods from the cooperative and did not 
receive patronage refunds. 
From the optimality conditions determined for these two 
sub-models, individual output supply, input demand, and 
consumption good demand functions were derived for the 
patrons. By horizontally summing these individual supply and 
demand functions across all member and across all nonmember 
patrons, aggregate functions were determined. 
The cooperative decision-maker was assumed to maximize 
the welfare function whose elements were the individual 
members' indirect utility functions. The decision-maker 
determined the optimal prices for the products it marketed and 
supplied and optimal level of club goods it provided. 
The optimality conditions for the general model of the 
cooperative were analyzed. Simplified models, including that 
of a single-product consumer cooperative, that of a single-
product marketing cooperative, and that of a single-product 
supply cooperative were analyzed. 
Finally, a model of the cooperative was developed to 
consider the effects of price uncertainty on the objective 
function. The cooperative decision-maker was assumed to 
maximize its welfare function which is to increase the sum of 
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individual members' expected profits, and decrease the 
member's risk. The optimality conditions for this model were 
analyzed. 
Conclusions 
The principal conclusion determined in this study is that 
the task of the cooperative decision-maker is a difficult one. 
The optimality conditions derived for the cooperative in this 
study are complex. Not only are the optimality conditions 
which were derived for the cooperative is this study complex, 
but there is a great amount of information which is necessary 
to evaluate them. It is doubtful that a cooperative will be 
able to fully attain the objective of maximizing the 
cooperative's welfare function. 
However, it is likely that the cooperative decision-maker 
will have some idea of how his decisions will affect the 
members' benefits. Then, many of the results of this study 
should be useful. The optimality conditions presented here 
can be of value to the cooperative which is attempting to 
maximize the welfare function even if it is not entirely 
successful in doing so. The model developed in this study was 
not intended to be a positive one but a normative-prescriptive 
one which would provide rules of behavior by which 
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cooperatives might strive to optimize their members' benefits 
which are measured by the cooperative's welfare function. 
Further Research 
There is no general agreement on what the objective or 
objectives of the cooperative are or should be. It would be 
interesting to develop and analyze the model with different 
objective functions. Candidates might include maximization of 
sum of the members' money income, where cooperative's 
consumption business tries to minimize members' expenditures 
on a fixed set of consumption goods. 
It would also be interesting to extend this model to 
enable us to handle the cooperative's financial problems. 
This would require developing a dynamic multi-period model, 
since this years business affects next year's business through 
the reserve and transferred funds. 
Finally, it would be interesting to try to develop a 
programming model of the cooperative and see how cooperative 
differ from proprietary corporations in the pricing of 
products. This would require a survey of cooperative and of 
proprietary corporations to see if the pricing mechanism 
differs between the two types of corporations. 
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